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HOSPITAL FLIGHT FROM MINORITY COMMUNITIES:
HOW OUR EXISTING CIVIL RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
FOSTERS RACIAL INEQUALITY IN HEALTHCARE
Brietta R. Clark*
Hope has two beautiful daughters. Their names are anger and
courage; anger at the way things are, and courage to see that they do
not remain the way they are.
-St. Augustine
On November 24, 2004, the fate of "Killer King" seemed undeniable.
"Killer King" is the nickname given to the Martin Luther King Jr.
Hospital, affiliated with Charles Drew Medical Center (the King/Drew
Medical Center) and located in the Watts area of Los Angeles,
California. On this day, the busiest trauma center in Los Angeles
County, the lifeline of the Watts community, was closed indefinitely. It
was considered the community's lifeline because it served one of the
"most violence-prone neighborhoods in the county, and is credited with
saving the lives of countless victims of gunshots, stabbings, and serious
traffic accidents." Closing the trauma center ignited fears that the rest
of the hospital would be taken away too.'
The County justified the closure on the grounds that the lapses
in quality of care were too grave to continue without significant
reform. 2 In fact, Killer King received its name in the community
Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School; J.D. University of Southern
California Law School; B.A. University of Chicago. I would like to thank the DePaul
University College of Law Center for Race and Bioethics and Journal of Health Care
Law, and especially Michele Goodwin, for allowing me to present a preliminary
version of this paper at this symposium. I would also like to thank the American
Society of Law, Medicine, & Ethics for allowing me to present this paper for
comments at the 2005 Annual Health Law Teachers Conference. Finally, I have
benefited greatly from the insights of Lisa lkemoto, Rand Rosenblatt, Sean Scott, and
Sidney Watson.
1 See Mitchell Landsberg & Jack Leonard, King/Drew's Trauma Unit Ordered Shut,
.

L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at C1.
2 See

Tracy Weber, Charles Ornstein, & Mitchell Landsberg, Part 1: Deadly Errors
and Politics Betray a Hospital's Promise, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, at C1
[hereinafter King/Drew Article Part 1] (Prior to the County's decision to close the
trauma center, King/Drew had lost private accreditation for three of its training
programs and was on the verge of losing overall hospital accreditation); Charlie
Leduff, Watts Symbol of Hope Becomes Center of Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
2004, at 24, available at http://www.racesci.org/in-media/NEW/watts.htm (the
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because it was notorious for constantly making severe errors that cost
patients' lives. 3 Despite these clear lapses in quality, the community
fought the closure. It rushed to protect King/Drew from what it
perceived to be a "government attack. ' 4 It is clear from the
community's response that any government involvement is viewed as a
threat to their rights and access to care, not a means of protection.
There is no faith that government action will result in better care; there
is only fear that such actions are thinly veiled attacks on one of the few
institutions in our health care system willing to serve minorities. 5 So
the community has rallied to King/Drew's side to protect the hospital
they see as the killer of its own people. Why? Because some care is
better than no care at all. The community sees King/Drew as their only
hope. They do not trust the health care system, the legal system, or the
political system to protect them.
This fear is neither atypical nor irrational in light of one of the
most visible, yet ignored, problems for minority communities hospital closures and relocations. Increasingly, hospitals, private and
public, have closed or terminated services in areas populated by
minorities, while relocating services to more affluent, predominantly
white neighborhoods. These closures have primarily occurred in urban
areas with the greatest need and least resources. Remaining hospitals
willing to care for minorities or the poor are either located far enough
away that timely care is effectively foreclosed or they are already
overburdened and understaffed. In fact, as early as 1979, the New
York Times identified hospital closings and relocations as "possibly the
most searing of the losses in the continuing pattern of inner-city
disintegration.... "6 Nonetheless, treatment of hospital flight from
minority communities as a "civil rights" issue has had a checkered past.
The most visible cause of racial inequality in health care was
the overt exclusion of minorities from hospitals and the segregation of
blacks and whites in hospital wards. Through the 1950s and 60s, some
county temporarily seized control over key administrative positions and the federal
government threatened to pull Medicaid and Medicare funding because of severe
lapses in quality).
3 See Landsberg & Leonard, King/Drew, supra note 1.

King/Drew spent $20.1

million on malpractice payouts during fiscal years 1999-2003 and was the subject of
recurring negative media attention of lives lost to medical mistakes. Id.

4 Mitchell Landsberg et al., Reaction to King/Drew Plan Loud and Clear, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2004.
5 See id.
6 Roger Wilkins, Loss of Hospitals in Central Cities Said to Cause Array of Problems,

N.Y.

TIMES,

Sept. 17, 1979, at D11.
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states enacted anti-discrimination laws to prohibit intentional race
discrimination, and in 1964, the Civil Rights Act was enacted at the
federal level. The Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination on the
basis of race, ethnicity, and national origin by recipients of federal
funding. While the federal prohibition was viewed by some as a
powerful symbol of racial equality, many minority communities were
skeptical. These communities were acutely aware of the limits of a law
applied to facially discriminatory actions, but that did not guarantee
true equality in the distribution of resources. Minority communities in
Los Angeles were vocal about these concerns, as they suffered from a
lack of adequate health, employment, and educational resources,
despite state anti-discrimination laws. 8

In health care, for example,

minority communities knew that antidiscrimination protection was
limited if public resources were not used to build and maintain
hospitals in their communities. Ironically, King/Drew was borne out of
this struggle for true equality in health care, and its construction in
1972 was supposed to be a symbol of the promise of racial equality. 9
Despite this skepticism, health care and civil rights advocates
initially believed that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act was a powerful
tool to address these resource inequities and to ensure equal access to
health care.10 Title VI's prohibition on race discrimination applies to
recipients of federal funding, which practically gave the federal
government significant power over private and local public entities.'I
The federal government's direct construction and operations funding of
hospitals, tax subsidies for nonprofit health care facilities, and its
indirect subsidization of health care facilities via the Medicare and
Medicaid insurance programs, gave the government expansive reach2
into both the private and public mechanisms for health care delivery.'
The government also created an Office of Civil Rights (OCR)
7 See

id.

8 See GERALD HORNE, FIRE THIS TIME: THE WATTS UPRISINGS

& THE

1960s, at 10-

11,45-63 (1995).
9 Leduff, supra note 2, at 24.
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000)

("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance.").

" See id.
12At

first, this was not necessarily the case. Title VI was enacted before the creation
of the Medicare and Medicaid system, and Hill-Burton funding was not seen as
important enough leverage to force compliance. See DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH
CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A NATION 91-94 (1999).
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dedicated to the enforcement of federal civil rights laws and established
a process through which complaints of discriminatory actions would be
investigated and remedied.
OCR was a visible symbol of the
government's purported commitment to the elimination of race
discrimination. Finally, the federal government promulgated what
appeared to be very patient protective regulations in that the regulations
expressly prohibited the use of criteria or methods, or choice of site
locations that have discriminatory effect.' 3 This appeared to give
minority communities the ability to use the courts to prevent hospital
closures where federal and local government failed to intervene.
Despite this promise, Title VI has not prevented the massive
hospital closures and removal of critical services from minority
communities. King/Drew's metamorphosis from a symbol of hope to
"Killer King" is merely one example of many in a patchwork of private4
and public health care that has failed racial and ethnic minorities.1
Indeed, the community's vocal mistrust of government and fear that
King/Drew is their best and only hope for health care is the most
compelling indictment of our traditional civil rights framework and its
failure to remedy the racial inequality in access to health care. When
we look at the problem of hospital relocations and closures, like
King/Drew, we see pieces of a complex and very frustrating puzzle. A
story is revealed, not simply about the discrete problems of racial
inequality in access to quality health care and the health and economic
consequences for individuals and the community at large, but of the
more fundamental problems of our notion of civil rights. This story
illuminates the disconnect between the legal construct developed and
the reality that minority communities face as victims of this system.
Consequently, this legal construct has had the perverse effect of
undermining the promise of Title VI in preventing the unequal
distribution of hospital resources, by making it almost impossible to
prevent even the most racially harmful hospital closures and
relocations.
Even beyond the harmful effects in any individual
challenge, the principles of equality and civil rights that have become
crystallized through the hospital relocation cases have infected our
discourse and impeded our ability to honestly critique the cause of
racial disparities that still exist in our health care system today.
In Part I, I provide a background of the hospital closure
problem, exploring the trends, effects, and reasons for the growing
numbers of hospital closures in minority communities. Studies of
"345 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2)
14 See infra Part I.

(2004).
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hospital restructuring reveal that they do indeed disproportionately
affect minority communities and are caused in large part by an
underfunding of indigent health care and government action that
encourages such closures. Moreover, despite common assumptions
that closures help, or are necessary to, conserve health care resources
and reduce excess bed capacity, the patterns of hospital closures
suggest the opposite - that such closures further strain our health care
resources by driving up the cost of hospital care and leaving Medicaid
and uninsured patients without access to early preventive and routine
care.
In the next three parts of this Article, I critique our existing civil
rights framework to show how certain structural and ideological
foundations of this framework have undermined our fight for true
equality in health care. I consider each piece of the Title VI puzzle that
is critical to enforcement:
the funding upon which the federal
government's power is based, the administrative mechanisms created to
enforce Title VI, and the scope of the rights granted to private plaintiffs
and their ability to use courts to enforce these rights where federal and
local governments have failed to prevent discriminatory actions. In
Part II, I explore more deeply the effects of such funding decisions,
showing how the government has consistently and consciously made
funding decisions that foster racial inequality, creating a health care
system that is incompatible with racial equality. In Part III, I show how
the government has visibly undermined its purported commitment to
civil rights by deliberately structuring the administrative arm
responsible for civil rights enforcement in ways that render it utterly
ineffective and by abandoning its facilities planning responsibility to
ensure racial equality in health care. In Part IV, I explore the third
piece of the puzzle -- the role of the courts through civil rights litigation
to show how courts have created doctrinal barriers that make it
impossible to win Title VI challenges to hospital closures.
In Part V, I address the implications for this failure, beyond the
effects in any individual case of closure. I argue that our existing Title
VI framework circumscribes our civil rights discourse in ways that
discourage an honest critique of the hospital closure problem and
stymies our vision for meaningful reform. One important consequence
of this framework is the tendency to ignore or significantly
underestimate the government's role in creating and maintaining an
inherently discriminatory structure for health care delivery.
For
example, while there is some acknowledgement of intersection of race
and economics in the discourse, it is used to engender sympathy for

1028

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[VOL.9.2:1023

government and private actors who are draining resources from
minority communities. As a result, there is a lack of public outrage
about the government's role in fostering race discrimination, and no
demand for a radical restructuring of the health care system that is
essential to achieving racial equality. This framework enables the
continuous draining of hospital resources from minority communities
that not only threatens their access to health care, but engenders
feelings of mistrust, helplessness, and anger.
This is where the quote from St. Augustine becomes relevant. I
believe that as legal advocates, we have a responsibility to harness the
anger within communities that suffer the greatest burdens under this
system and the anger we should all feel at this conscious and sustained
neglect by our government, and use it to advocate for a fundamental
redefinition of our notion of equality in health care. Moreover, legal
advocates have a duty to use legal tools in creative ways to increase
awareness and to empower communities to drive needed health care
reform. In Part VI, I offer some suggestions toward this end. My
suggestions include both short and long term ideas for minimizing
disparities, incorporate traditional and nontraditional legal tools, and
consider even unpopular approaches for reform. If we can use our
anger constructively and have the courage to engage in what is sure to
be a long and difficult fight for equality, I have hope that our notion of
civil rights, at least as applied to health care access, will finally evolve.
I. HOSPITAL FLIGHT FROM MINORITY COMMUNITIES
Hospital relocations and closures are a nationwide problem and one
that is longstanding. 15 The implications for racial minorities' access to
15 See

Urban Hospital Closings in the Face of Racial Change Before the

Subcommittee on Health, Committee of Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 195 (1980)
(statement of Alan Sager) [hereinafter Sager, Testimony]. See also Mitchell F. Rice,
Inner-City Hospital closures/Relocations: Race, Income Status, and Legal Issues, 24

SOC. SCI. MED. 889, 896 (1987). "Nationally, dozens of hospitals close or relocate
each year. For example, over the three years, 1975-1977, 231 hospitals closed or
relocated according to data collected by the AHA. This means about 80 hospitals per
year"; "[b]etween 1976 and 1980 there were 296 hospitals registered with the
American Hospital Association that closed." Id. at 896. During the last decade,
hospitals nationwide lost 103,000 staffed beds and 7,800 medical/surgical beds, and
370 emergency departments disappeared between 1994-1999.
See Stephanie
Mencimer, Rich Man, Spore Man: If the Elite want to Survive Bioterrorism, They'll

Have to Make Sure the PoorDo, Too, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Dec. 1, 2001, at 34
(describing how in the last five years California has closed more than 23 hospitals and
40 emergency rooms; Massachusetts lost 24 percent of its hospital beds between
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health care became visible during the 1980s as a result of civil rights
litigation brought to prevent the growing number of private and public
closures. 16 During this time, social scientists and policy analysts began
focusing on this problem by studying the patterns of hospital
reconfiguration, analyzing their causes and impact on health care
delivery.17 These studies confirmed what civil rights advocates and
minority communities already knew: private hospitals were leaving
minority communities, and those with the least resources, in order to
relocate to more affluent, predominantly white communities. At the
same time, public hospitals, upon which minorities and the poor relied
heavily, were falling victim to closure by local governments trying to
conserve resources. 18

1988-1998; in a one-week period in Boston, the city's 17 major hospitals were
operating at an unheard of 96.2 occupancy rate, with emergency rooms closed to
ambulances on a regular basis; in Cleveland, four of the region's leading hospitals last
year were in bankruptcy, the high-level trauma center at Mt. Sinai was closed and in
May metro Cleveland's 22 emergency rooms were simultaneously closed to
ambulances for almost 10 percent of the month due to lack of space). See also Mary
Chris Jaklevic, Trouble in the City; Mergers, Medicare and Managed Care Combine
to Force Closing of 38 Urban Hospitals, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 8, 2001, at 52.
15 Julie Piotrowski, How Secure is the Safety Net? Public Hospitals Learn to Survive
in an Increasingly Tight Market by Closing, Building, Replacing and Sometimes
Converting, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 25, 2002, at 34. Between 1979-1982, 70
public hospitals across the United Stated closed.
See ALAN SAGER, THE
RECONFIGURATION OF URBAN HOSPITAL CARE: 1937 - 1980, reprinted in CITIES AND
HEALTH CARE IN URBAN AMERICA 55 (Ann Lennarsan Greer & Scott
Greer eds., 1983) [hereinafter SAGER, RECONFIGURATION]. While public hospitals
accounted for one-third of all hospital beds in 1950, by 1985, they only accounted for
one-seventh. Id. See generally FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL
CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1986); HARRY F. DOWLING, CITY HOSPITALS:
SICKNESS:

THE UNDERCARE OF THE UNDERPRIVILEGED (1982).
16Julie Piotrowski, How Secure is the Safety Net?

Public Hospitals Learn to Survive
in an Increasingly Tight Market by Closing, Building, Replacing and Sometimes
Converting, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 25, 2002 at 34. Between 1979 and 1982, 70
public hospitals across the United Stated closed. See SAGER, RECONFIGURATION,
supra note 15, at 55. While public hospitals accounted for one-third of all hospital
beds in 1950, by 1985, they only accounted for one-seventh. See id. See generally
FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES (1986); HARRY F. DOWLING, CITY HOSPITALS: THE UNDERCARE OF
THE UNDERPRIVILEGED (1982).

17 See Rice, supra note 15; Sara McLafferty, The Geographical Restructuring of

Urban Hospitals: Spatial dimensions of Corporate Strategy, 23 SOC. SCI. & MED.
1079 (1986) (study of hospital closures in New York).
18 See LAURIE KAYE ABRAHAM, MAMA MIGHT BE BETTER OFF DEAD: THE FAILURE
OF HEALTH CARE IN URBAN AMERICA 111

(1993).
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These studies provide support for the story that minority
communities have shared through their own narratives, political action,
and law suits alleging race discrimination in violation of Title VI. They
demonstrate why this problem cannot be understood by simply looking
at an isolated instance of one hospital's decision to close or relocate
services and comparing the immediate effects of closure with the
hospital's or local government's purported justifications. Closures
must be considered in light of hospitals' role in the larger public-private
patchwork used to deliver health care in this country. They must be
considered as part of a trend created and furthered by federal and local
action, as well as conscious inaction. Finally, they make clear that we
can not simply accept claims of fiscal concern and economic pressure
as sufficient justifications for such closures.
9
A. Harmful Effects of Hospital Closures'
Alan Sager has performed the most comprehensive study of hospital
restructuring to date, reviewing the patterns of hospital restructuring
from 1937-1980 in eighteen cities of the Northeast and Midwest. 2° His
study documented significant correlations between race and the
location of hospital closings or removal of services. Specifically, Sager
found that "[a]s the minority proportion of the neighborhood around the
hospital increases, so does the proportion of hospitals closing or
relocating.... "21 This conclusion was supported by another study of
hospital restructuring that documented an even stronger racial
correlation between the likelihood of closures and the racial makeup of
the in-patient population of the hospital.22 Social scientists have also
observed an important correlation between the location of closures and
the socioeconomic status of the community affected by closure. For
example, both Sager and Sara McLafferty have noted the trends of
hospital closures or the termination of services within areas of
predominantly lower socio economic status (SES), with high portions

19Throughout the article, I will use the term hospital closures generically to include
the closure of an entire hospital, the termination of certain hospital departments (such
as the closure of King/Drew's trauma center), or the termination and exclusive
relocation of hospital services to a different geographic location..
20 Sager, Testimony, supra note 15.
21See Sager, Testimony, supra note 15, at 388. For example, in neighborhoods 025% black in 1970, only 14.2% of the 1937 hospitals had closed or relocated by 1977,
while almost half of the hospitals (46.9%) had disappeared in neighborhoods that
were 76-100% black in 1970. Id.
22 See id; Rice, supra note 15, at 891. SAGER, RECONFIGURATION, supra note 15, at
55.
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of Medicaid and uninsured patients, and the relocation of those services
to high SES areas.23 The correlation of race and SES to hospital
closures is critical to understanding the magnitude of the effects of
closure for minority communities with the least resources and greatest
need.
The magnitude of the harm suffered by minority communities
may not be immediately obvious because our health care system is a
complex patchwork of private and public actors without clearly defined
duties. The effects of closure depend in large part on the availability
and willingness of other hospitals to help fill the community's needs.
In theory, closure of a facility will not adversely affect care, if there are
other facilities in the community that can adequately provide needed
care in a timely manner. However, a number of factors, including overt
and covert racial bias, economic discrimination, and overcrowding of
public hospitals, undermine the ability or willingness of other hospitals
to adequately fill this need. Moreover, hospital closures can trigger a
domino effect that threatens longer term access and quality of care for
a quality primary care
remaining hospitals, and the maintenance of 24
network of providers for minority communities.
1. Disruption in Inpatient, Outpatient, and Emergency
Services
The most obvious effect of closure is a disruption of hospital services
to residents in the affected community, such as inpatient acute care,
outpatient services, and emergency room or trauma services. 2 ' The
increased travel time and distance for residents needing emergency care
can mean the difference between life and death. The SES factor
compounds the negative effects of hospital closures because residents
of these communities are often exposed to extraordinarily high rates of
violent crimes (i.e., shootings and stabbings) or are more likely to
suffer from a serious or life-threatening illness at the point they enter
due to a lack of insurance or ability to pay for
the health care system
26
preventive care.

23 See McLafferty, supra note 17.
24 See Rice, supra note 15, at 892-93. See generally Sager, Testimony, supra note 17;
ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 60-76.
25 See Rice, supra note 15, at 893-94; SAGER, RECONFIGURATION, supra note 15, at

55.
26 See

supra note 18, at 60-76, 111 (The "trauma center is indispensable in
a neighborhood where so many residents are literally torn apart by violence).
ABRAHAM,
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Even in nonemergency cases, the increased time and distance
faced by minority communities has a demonstrable impact on their
access to health care.2 7 A common scenario is that services are
relocated from a lower SES, predominantly minority community to a
more affluent, primarily white community located a great distance
away. This effectively forecloses care where affordable private or
public transportation is not available. 28 Second, even where public
transportation exists, the added time for travel and cost can create
barriers too difficult for residents of these communities to overcome,
given their already precarious balancing of work, childcare, and other
care giving responsibilities. 29 For patients who speak limited English
and depend on friends or family to accompany them to the doctor for
translation, the extra time involved may make it more difficult or even
impossible to coordinate times for appointment. 30 To the extent that
people in the affected communities are discouraged or prevented from
accessing early treatment, this increases the likelihood that patients
will
3
be sicker by the time they finally do enter the health care system. '
This disruption in access to hospital care is made worse by the
unreliability of remaining voluntary or public hospitals to provide
patients with timely and medically appropriate care. 32 Despite Title
Studies show that increased travel time is associated with marked reductions in the
use of out-patient hospital care. See Sager, Testimony, supra note 15, at 396.
28 ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 44-59.
For the indigent with serious, disabling
conditions, such closures are devastating. Abraham chronicles one family's struggle
through the health care system in Chicago. One of the central figures was Mrs.
Jackson, who was sixty-nine years old at the beginning of Abraham's research and
suffered from a number of disabling conditions that kept her from being able to use
public transportation. She could not private transportation to get to routine medical
appointments or to seek care when a problem developed. Abraham takes us through a
number of instances in which they alternated between waiting until her condition
became serious enough to "justify" the ambulance coming or calling 911 and lying to
them in order to get the ambulance to take her to the hospital anyway. See also
Wilmington v. NAACP, 491 F. Supp. 290, 302-03 (D.C. Del. 1980) [hereinafter
Wilmington II] (plaintiffs' claims that the proposed hospital closures and relocation of
services to a suburban hospital would have a disparate impact on racial minorities in
violation of Title VI and persons with disabilities under the Federal Rehabilitation
Act); Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2nd Cir. 1980) (alleging that closure of a public
hospital would violate the disparate impact prohibition under Title VI and the
Americans with Disabilities Act); Rodde v. Bonta, 357 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2004).
29 See ABRAHAM, supra note 18, 146-66.
30 See, e.g., Wilmington I, 491 F. Supp. at 302-03; Rodde, 357 F.3d at 988.
31 See ABRAHAM, supra note 18, 44-76.
32 See generally Sager, supra note 15; Vernellia R. Randall, Racist Health Care:
Reforming an Unjust Health Care System to Meet the Needs of African-Americans, 3
27
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VI's prohibition on race discrimination, many hospitals have continued
to overtly discriminate against racial and ethnic minorities or have used
For
economic proxies to disguise intentional discrimination. 33
example, in a speech given by the Director of the OCR in 1999, he
cited a number of overt Title VI violations by hospitals, including a
New York hospital with segregated maternity wards, a hospital in
McAllen, Texas, that clothed its security officers in uniforms
resembling the Border Patrol, and a South Carolina hospital that had a
policy in effect of not giving epidurals to non-English speaking
Even where there is no evidence of overt racial
women. 34
discrimination, however, hospitals regularly engage in overt and covert
discrimination against Medicaid recipients and the uninsured, which
disproportionately harms minorities.35 Finally, in cases where there are
hospitals located within a reasonable distance and willing to serve
residents in the affected communities, these hospitals are often
overburdened and/or provide substandard care so that residents are still
effectively prevented from accessing timely and quality medical care.3 6
2. Long Term Threats to Primary Care Services & Quality
of Care
A less obvious effect of hospital closures is the disruption in primary
care services, due in part to "physician flight" following the hospitals
that leave the inner city. Sager identified this pattern as part of the
larger trend of the de facto segregation of inner-city communities. This
"physician flight" began as an outgrowth of the typical de facto
residential segregation that took off during the 1970s and 80s as
physicians followed their patients who moved to the suburbs. Initially,
HEALTH MATRIX: J. L. MED.

127 (1993) [hereinafter Randall, Racist Health Care];

Lisa M. Enfield & David P. Sklar, Patient Dumping in the Hospital Emergency
Department: Renewed Interest in an Old Problem, 13 AM. J. L. & MED. 561 (1988).

13See infra Part II.A. For example, many for-profit hospitals do not believe that they
have a duty to provide indigent care because they subsidize such care as taxpayers.
See Rice, supra note 15, at 894. Moreover, despite the charitable obligations
undertaken by nonprofit hospitals, there is evidence that they discourage indigent care
in many instances.
34 See Thomas Perez, Director, Office for Civil Rights, Department of Health and
Human Services, Remarks at the New England Regional Minority Health Conference
(Apr. 13, 1999). In every case the OCR entered into a settlement with the hospital.
There were no instances in which funding was terminated. See id.

35 See generally Sidney D. Watson, Race, Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequality
and Incentives, 27 AM. J. L. MED. 203 (2001). See also ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at

72-74; Randall, supra note 32, at 148-152.

36 See Rice, supra note 15, at 894; ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 93-133.
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physicians would maintain two, practices - one in the suburbs and one

in the city; gradually, however, physicians maintained fewer hours at
their city location, until they decided to close it altogether. 37 Hospital
closures further encourage the departure of primary care physicians in
minority communities because these hospitals are a critical base for the
physicians' practice. 38 This creates a vicious cycle as physicians with
hospital-based practices leave the community, causing affected
residents to become even more dependent on the few remaining public
or private hospitals and further straining remaining hospitals' ability or
willingness to provide a safety net for the poor. 39 These effects are
evident through the increasing dependence of minority communities on
hospital emergency rooms and public hospitals for routine and other
non-emergency care:
[F]or a large number of minority and low-income
individuals more often than not the public hospital's
emergency department services as an entry point into the
health system. It is not unusual for the public hospital to
act as the primary care center, preventive care center,
trauma center and the intensive care center for the indigent
patient such as the feverish baby, the shooting victim, the
high risk pregnancy, the premature neonate...." With this
kind of activity and care the public hospital's emergency
department has become the 'family doctor' of inner city
communities.4 °
Public hospitals have historically been the safety net for poorer
residents and primarily minority communities for all types of care, in
large part because of racial bias and/or financial discrimination by
physicians and private hospitals. 4 1 Thus, the combination of public and
private emergency room closures has compounded the problem of
access to all types of care for minority communities.
Another long term effect of private hospital closures and
relocations is the ultimate deterioration, or what has been commonly
" See id.
38 See SAGER, supra note 15,
39 See SAGER, supra note 15,
40 See id.; Dowling, supra

at 90. See also Rice, supra note 15, at 891.
at 90.
note 16, at 187; ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 65, 95

("hospital outpatient departments are used much more commonly by poor minorities
than others").
41 See Randall, Racist Health Care, supra note 32, at 148-52.

supra note 16, at 187; Rice, supra note 15, at 894.

See also Dowling,
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termed "ghettoization," of the remaining hospital facility. 4 2 Social
scientists and health advocates have documented the problem of
relocating critical services and physician resources out of communities
that need it the most, leaving them with facilities that are not
adequately maintained or served by physicians and local planning
entities.4 3 The result is a gradual deterioration of the facility plant and
quality of care delivered to the affected communities. Hospital closures
set into motion a chain of events that threaten minority communities'
immediate and long term access to primary care, emergency and
nonemergency hospital care, and results in a substandard quality of care
provided by the few deteriorating or overburdened facilities that
remain.
3. Psychological Effects
I began with a discussion of King/Drew because it highlights one of the
most devastating effects of hospital closures - the psychic harm that
results to minority communities from the disproportionate closures and
reduction of services in minority communities. There are at least two
dimensions of this harm that may not be immediately obvious. First,
psychological harm results when there is a violation of an expectation
of access to care, which can arise from the removal of care that is
already being provided.4 4 For more affluent communities, hospital
closures will not necessarily trigger this effect because the expectation
of access to care is not significantly disrupted. For residents of these
communities, hospital stays are not typically considered part of
everyday life. Interactions with hospitals are rare, while relationships
with primary care physicians, nursing homes, and rehabilitation centers
are much more significant.4 5 When a hospital stay is necessary, people
in these communities typically have a choice of where to go. The trend
shows hospitals competing for these "markets" so there typically will
not be a shortage of providers willing to treat these patients. In order to
fully grasp the psychological dimension of hospital closures on
minority communities, however, it is critical to understand the different
experience of minority communities that depend on these hospitals for
42

See, e.g., Rice, supra note 15, at 892 (describing the deterioration of the inner city

facility in Gary, Indiana, after a partial relocation of services to the suburbs); Sager
Testimony, supra note 17, at 390-92. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 18.
43

See DAVID

BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A NATION
ABRAHAM, supra note 18.

(1999);
44 See Rice, supra note 15, at 893.
45 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 18.
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their survival and are often left with little if any effective alternatives
for care as a result of such closures.
Affected communities are acutely aware of their dependence on
hospitals for their lives.
Losing services so vital to the community
triggers the ultimate fear of survival. We hear this fear in the King
Drew community's outrage when the County decided to close
King/Drew's trauma unit, the busiest trauma unit in the city. Vast
numbers of people with life threatening conditions would have to travel
at least an extra ten or fifteen minutes to the next closest ER, a distance
that could mean the difference between life and death. Moreover, the
ability and willingness of the other hospitals to treat the sickest and
poorest of the Watts community is questionable.
Closure of
King/Drew's trauma center literally meant cutting the community's
lifeline. Recently, Jesse Jackson captured the intensity of this fear in
his statements on behalf of the Watts community, protesting closure of
the trauma center:
People here are so emotional because they feel
threatened.... People are scared. There are car wrecks on
the freeway - they're scared. Most of these folks don't
have insurance - they're scared. They've made AK-47s
and Uzis legal again - they're6 scared ....
This hospital was
4
born from that kind of pain."
Another source of psychological harm is the violation of
expectation about the level of care received relative to others. Such
expectations arise from the promise of equality guaranteed through
federal and local antidiscrimination laws and from local mandates
about the minimal level of care required for all communities. 47 While
minority communities are ever conscious of the racial and economic
disparities in society generally, hospital closures reify this disparity in
immediate and powerful ways that exacerbate feelings of racial stigma.
This is particularly the case where a private or public entity is not just
closing a hospital, but is terminating services or closing a facility as
part of a larger plan to relocate services to predominantly white
communities that are more affluent and do not have as a great a need.
Relocations and closures are a signal to affected communities that those
in charge of doling out public resources have given up on the
46 See Reaction to King/Drew Plan Loud and Clear, supra note 4.
47 See, e.g., CAL WELF. & INST. CODE §17000 (2001) (creating an obligation by the

County to provide adequate indigent care).
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community - that newer facilities in affluent areas will be given
priority in the allocation of scarce resources. This sends a clear
message to minority communities that they are less valuable and less
deserving of certain resources than the white communities. 4 8 Once
again, commentary on King/Drew reflects the racial stigma attached to
hospital closures:
Community activists, who fought so hard for the hospital's
creation, are [] consumed with the fear that it could be
closed. * * * Strong willed and fiercely protective ... a
coterie of African America leaders, most now in their 70s
and 80s, [] defend King/Drew with the same intensity that
they once devoted to the civil rights movement. To them it
is part of the same struggle.
Some vividly recall how things used to be, when they had
to find a ride to the main county hospital some 15 miles
away. It was a long trip if you didn't have a car - and most
people didn't. "Twenty-five dollars sick" meant you were
in bad enough shape to pay for a cab across town.
Many remember the case of Leonard Deadwyler, a black
man who in 1966 was rushing his pregnant wife from their
home in Watts to County General Hospital ... in Boyle
Heights when police stopped him for speeding. An officer
approached his car and shot him to death. The shooting
was determined to have been an accident, but many saw it
as a racist killing.
48

Justice Thurgood Marshall has recognized that such psychological harm and racial

stigma can result from facially neutral action. See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451
U.S. 100, 138 (Justice Marshall dissenting from a majority opinion rejecting a
Section 1983 and Thirteenth Amendment challenge to a street closing in Memphis
that created a barrier between a white residential community and a bordering
community that was predominantly black). In his dissent, Justice Marshall described
the nature of the stigma that can result from such actions:
Until the closing of West Drive, the most direct route for those who
lived on or near Springdale St. was straight down West Drive. Now the
Negro drivers are being told in essence: "You must take the long way
around because you don't live in this 'protected' white neighborhood."
Justice Marshall made clear that "valuing inconvenience lightly ignores the plain and
powerful symbolic message of the 'inconvenience."'
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They also remember how the voters of Los Angeles
County, mostly white, refused to pay for King/Drew's
construction, forcing Supervisor Kenneth Hahn to find
money elsewhere. Even now, threats to trim the hospital's
budget revive fears that whites are trying to take it away. 49
It is clear from the protests of the Watts community that any
government action to terminate certain services at the hospital is
viewed as a threat to their rights, not a means of protection. There is no
faith that government action will result in better care; there is only fear
that such actions are thinly veiled attacks on one of the few institutions
willing to serve minorities in a health system that continues to exclude
and dehumanize people of color. 50 It is difficult to communicate the
dehumanizing effects suffered as a result of these closures. Narratives,
such as those presented in Mama Might be Better Off Dead, by Laurie
Abraham, and sporadic newspaper articles about communities' protests
of proposed closures help to present this picture from the community's
perspective. However, I will offer two examples based on recent
testimony by an emergency room physician at a Los Angeles town hall
meeting.
California has been particularly hard hit by a health care crisis
in recent years, with more than 70 hospital emergency room and trauma
centers closed since 1990, creating a shortage of health care facilities
and professionals. The problem of hospital closures and overburdened
emergency rooms, while receiving little media attention, is considered a
major crisis by physicians, health advocates, and patients. About a year
ago, a proposition was proposed to raise funds to reimburse emergency
rooms and physicians in California who treat indigent patients. In his
testimony in favor of this proposition, an emergency room physician
recalled a woman who had a miscarriage was forced to wait in the
hospital waiting room for hours with her fetus in a Tupperware dish
before she could be seen. He also testified about the lack of physician
specialists willing to serve on call for emergency rooms in these urban
settings. He recalled a boy who came into the emergency room with a
serious head injury, but could not be helped properly. The physician
said he could not find the proper specialist at any of the other local
ERs, and the boy was not able to get the emergency treatment he
needed. These patients and their families could not access needed care
49 See King/Drew Article Part 1, supra note 1.
50

See Reaction to King/Drew Plan Loud and Clear, supra note 2.
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in a timely manner because of a shortage of physicians and
overburdened emergency rooms, due in large part to the closures of
hospitals and draining of resources in the most vulnerable communities.
These were not atypical occurrences.
The emergency room physician did not have words to express
the humiliation and helplessness he knew the woman experienced who
had the miscarriage. Nor could he effectively communicate the
frustration and hopelessness the boy's parents experienced as they
watched him suffer preventable injuries because he could not get the
necessary care in time.
Minority communities experience this
frustration, helplessness, and dehumanizing feeling each time they
encounter barriers to access, but such feelings are intensified as they
watch critical hospital services leave their communities. Ironically,
California law acknowledges the psychic dimension of the harm that
can result where such barriers to care exist. For example, it requires
that "Every county and city shall relieve and support all incompetent,
poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or
accident [when] such persons are not supported [by other means], 5 1 and
that "aid shall be administered and services provided promptly and
humanely, with due regard for the preservation of family life, and
without discrimination....."52 Unfortunately, this mandate has not
prevented the dehumanizing effects of hospital flight on minority
communities.
B. Why Are Hospitals Leaving?
In 1978, the American Hospital Association published an article
summarizing the results of a survey done of administrators of closed or
relocated hospitals to ascertain the primary reasons for closure.53 They
surveyed 231 hospitals that closed or relocated during the years 19751977. Of 231 hospitals, the reasons for closure or relocation were
broken down as follows: 27% reported financial reasons for closure or
relocation, 23% were replaced by a new facility, 14% closed due to low
occupancy rate; 13% closed because they were outdated facilities; and
10% closed due to inadequate supply of physicians. 54 These are
consistent with the reasons offered by defendants in legal challenges
brought to prevent closure. In every case, defendants give economic
51 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000.
52 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
13 See id.
14 See id.
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justifications for closure. 55 Fiscal reasons are heavily relied upon by
local governments deciding to close public hospitals or allowing private
hospitals to relocate services from minority communities.56
Secondarily, criteria such as occupancy rate and quality of the facility
are cited as important considerations.57
These justifications have created the perception that the benefits
of hospital closures typically outweigh any disadvantages.
This
perception is based on the assumption that such closures actually
reduce excess bed capacity, improve quality of care, and help save
scarce public resources that will benefit society at large. Studies of
hospital restructuring have called such assumptions into question. For
example, Sager demonstrated that although the rate of closures was
increasing, the pattern of hospital relocations and closures did not
reduce overall bed capacity. This is because while some hospitals were
closing, others were expanding their bed capacity. 58 Moreover, the
location of the bed reductions did not correlate to communities with
existing overcapacity; rather, minority communities and lower SES
communities with the highest
need for hospital beds tended to
59
Ioss.
greatest
the
experience
Trends in the types of hospitals closed and expanded over time
provided further evidence that the pattern of restructurings were more
likely to drive up the cost of health care, rather than enable the
government to conserve resources. For example, Sager found that
smaller community hospitals were more likely to close, while larger
See, e.g., Wilmington II, 491 F. Supp. 290, 302-03, 340; Bryan, 627 F.2d at 614;
Mussington v. St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital Center, No. 92-89618 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Dec. 11, 1992) (complaint). Mussington was ultimately dismissed on procedural
grounds. Mussington v. St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital Center, 824 F. Supp. 427
(S.D.N.Y 1993).
56 See., e.g., McLafferty, supra note 17, at 1085. For example, in an article
about the
trends of hospital restructuring, McLafferty studied the geographical restructuring of
hospitals in New York City in the late 1960s and early 70s and found that the state
actively encouraged the closure of 29 hospitals during this time. Id. Public reports
had linked excess hospital bed capacity to rapid increases in medical costs. Id. [T]he
state proposed a plan to reduce excess bed capacity by closing 30 hospitals in New
York City. Id. All of the targeted hospitals were small and their names were published
in a much publicized 'hit list'. Id. Although direct action was taken in only a few
cases, inclusion on the hit list became a self-fulfilling prophesy that undermined
consumer and physician confidence in the hospitals. Id. All but one of the listed
hospitals ultimately closed. Id.
51 See, e.g., Wilmington II, 491 F. Supp. at 302-303, 340; Bryan, 627 F.2d at 614;
Mussington, 824 F.Supp. at 427.
58 See SAGER, supra note 15, at
88.
59 See id.
51
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hospitals, especially teaching facilities and hospitals located in higher
60
SES communities, were often expanded or renovated substantially.
Sager argued that this can result in an overall increase in health care
costs for two reasons. First, these patterns suggest that patients are
being shuffled from smaller community hospitals that are typically
better suited to providing the kind of care needed, and at relatively low
cost, to larger, more expensive facilities that are less focused on61
delivering the kind of care most needed by the affected communities.
Second, to the extent that hospital closures disrupt access to preventive
and early treatment for underserved communities, patients enter the
health care system when they are sicker and in need of more expensive
medical treatment:
It seems clear that the observed pattern of reconfiguration
is not moving us toward some desirable stable state of
fewer, stronger, and more appropriately sized and located
institutions able to serve their cities' patients. Rather,
public hospital bed reductions and the closing of less costly
voluntary hospitals (both serving high proportions of
minority and Medicaid-funded patients) will oblige
surviving hospitals - if they have room - to choose

between denying care to displaced patients and admitting
them, possibly lessening their own chances of remaining
open.
Despite the fact that hospital closures have not remedied
purported fiscal concerns about conserving scarce resources, there are
powerful economic incentives for hospitals' to flee predominantly
minority, low SES communities. First, because many physicians have
relocated their practice to suburban areas, there is a shortage of
physicians willing to use the hospitals in these urban communities as
their patient base.63 Physician referrals are critical to a hospital's
ability to attract private pay patients, and so this shortage of physicians
has resulted in a decrease in the number of private pay patients using
these hospitals. On the other hand, demographic changes have resulted
60

Basic secondary care is usually not the focus of many of these hospitals, so even

routine care is much more expensive in these hospitals. See
89-90.
61See Sager, Testimony, supra note 15, at 400.
62 See SAGER, supra note 15, at 88.

63 See Sager, Testimony, supra note 15, at 394-95.

SAGER,

supra note 15, at
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in an increase in patients less able to pay for care, either because they
are unable to get private or public insurance or because they receive
Medicaid (which does not provide adequate reimbursement). 64 Thus,
hospitals have faced a changing in-patient population that resulted in
significant reductions in patient revenue. Consequently, the problem of
hospital closures is caused by both an underfunding65of health services
for the poor and an inadequate supply of physicians.
While some hospitals experience severe revenue reductions that
force them to consider alternatives for economic survival, it is not
necessarily the case that these hospitals are on the brink of financial
disaster or even close to it. Rather, many hospitals have begun acting
like typical corporations in a competitive market; that is, hospitals are
increasingly considering strategies to maximize their profits to ensure
their long term survival, such as relocation to more affluent markets.
Another common strategy has been to renovate facilities and expand
technological capability to attract more physicians with a wealthier
patient base. While this may enhance quality of care for the most
affluent, it has actually increased the cost of care generally and
depleted resources that should be directed to communities in need.6 6
Finally, social scientists and health policy analysts have attributed these
trends to the failure of local and federal government to create a
sustainable health care financing system and to the government's shift
away from active facilities planning to a largely unregulated industry
that allows market competition to determine hospital restructuring
patters. 67 In some cases, local governments have actively encouraged
or facilitated closures and relocations that were clearly driven by
market competition, but that harmed communities in dire need of
6
hospital resources. 8

64

See id. at 395. See also

ABRAHAM,

supra note 18, at 94 (describing how "many

Chicago institutions fled the [trauma] network during the late 1980s citing heavy

losses incurred from treating severely injured patients who tend to be uninsured or
covered by Medicaid."). As discussed further in the next part, this problem was
caused in large part by the lack of universal health insurance system, barriers
minorities faced in getting employment that would provide private insurance and the
inadequate funding of Medicaid.
65 See Rice, supra note 15, at 891-92 (citing studies establishing a direct link between
hospitals' financial stress and care to the poor); McLafferty, supra note 16, at 1079.
66 See SAGER, supra note 15, at 88.
67 See McLafferty, supra note 17, at 1079; Rice, supra note 15, at 890.
68 See McLafferty, supra note 17, at 1080.
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C. Hospital Flight as a Civil Rights Issue
In response to the increasing flight of hospitals from predominantly
minority, urban communities, civil rights and health care advocates
partnered to bring Title VI legal challenges to prevent public and
private closures. Title VI was believed to be a powerful weapon in the
fight against racial disparities in distribution of hospital resources for
three reasons. First, the federal funding requirement meant that Title
VI obligations reached into almost every aspect of health care delivery
because of the federal government's extensive funding of private and
public hospitals. Second, an Office of Civil Rights (OCR) was created
and charged with the enforcement of federal civil rights laws in all
areas. Finally, pursuant to authority granted in Title VI, the agency
overseeing health care administration, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (DHEW) used its power to promulgate
regulations that explicitly prohibited recipients of federal funding from
using criteria or methods of administration that have discriminatory
effects 69 or from choosing a "site or location of a facility" that would
have such effects. 70 Thus, Title VI prohibited precisely the kind of
racial inequality that resulted from hospital relocations and closures,
without proof of intentional racial bias. Moreover, it empowered
DHEW, through the OCR, to actively prevent such discriminatory
effects, and it appeared to give communities a private right of action
under Title VI to prevent closures where the government failed to do
SO.

Yet Title VI was not the weapon advocates hoped it would be.
While the failures of civil rights laws to remedy problems of
discriminatory effects is not new or unique to health care, the hospital
closure problem is particularly useful for critiquing our traditional civil
69

Specifically, the regulations provide that "[a] recipient [of federal funding], in

determining the types of services... or facilities which will be provided under any
such program... or the situations in which, such services... or facilities will be
provided under any such program, or the class of individuals to be afforded an
opportunity to participate in any such program, may not.. .utilize criteria or methods
of administration which the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because
of their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially
impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a
particular race, color, or national origin." 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(3).
70 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(3). The regulations go even further by noting that recipients
may not choose "the site or location of a facility ... with the effect of excluding
individuals from, denying them the benefits of, or subjecting them to discrimination
under any programs to which this regulation applies, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin; or with the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing
the accomplishment of the objectives of the Act or this regulation."

1044

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[VOL.9.2:1023

rights framework, as well as, for understanding more specifically the
problem of racial inequality in health care. In order to flesh this out, I
will examine all three parts of the civil rights framework critical to
preventing discriminatory closures: (1) federal legislation providing
significant health care subsidies for public and private health care
providers; (2) the federal government's administrative power to oversee
state hospital planning and to ensure Title VI compliance in the
distribution of health care resources; and (3) the judiciary's role as
providing a check on the federal and state actors, as well as private
hospitals, attempting to restructure hospital services in discriminatory
ways. In Parts II - IV of this article, I will show how in each of part,
the government has not only failed to live up to the promise of Title VI,
it has made decisions that have fostered racial inequity in the
distribution of hospital resources and demonstrated, at a minimum, a
conscious disregard for the effects on minorities' access to care.
II. CIVIL RIGHTS & FEDERAL FUNDING:
THE ROLE OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING IN
EXACERBATING RACIAL DISPARITIES
[I]t is possible to view hospital closings and relocations as
partial symptoms, first of deficiencies in physician
availability and distribution (both geographically and by
specialty) and second, of an underfunding of health
services of the poor.... But we need to ask the questions,
Why wasn't there enough money? Why replace the
hospital? Why did occupancy rates fall? Why was the
physical plan outdated?
Why weren't there enough
71
doctors?
The primary reason Title VI was viewed by patients' advocates and
civil rights lawyers as a powerful weapon to deal with the problems of
health care access was because of the extensive federal funding
reaching into almost every aspect of health care delivery. The
government's direct construction and operations funding to hospitals,
indirect subsidization of health care facilities via Medicare and
Medicaid, and tax subsidies for nonprofit health care facilities gave the
government expansive reach into both the private and public
mechanisms for health care delivery. In theory, the government could
71 See Sager, Testimony, supra note 15, at 390.
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regulate almost every type of provider, from physicians to nursing
homes to private and public hospitals. This also gave it the power to
oversee and challenge any discriminatory allocation of resources by
states and local government planning of health care facilities. Thus, in
order to critique the successes and failures of civil rights law, we must
consider the patterns of funding and government activity in this area.
A. Overview of the Healthcare System
In order to understand the critical role federal funding plays in
determining equitable access to hospital care, one must be familiar with
the structure of our healthcare system and the private/public patchwork
of health insurers and providers used to provide care. It is helpful to
think of our health care delivery system in terms of two components.
One is the direct provision of care through the construction of health
care facilities and employment of professionals, such as physicians and
nurses. The other is through an insurance system that guarantees
reimbursement to health care providers. Both are critical to ensuring
access to care. Without insurance, most individuals are practically
barred from accessing all but the most emergent care because of
extraordinary cost. If health care facilities and providers are not
distributed equitably, entire communities may be foreclosed from
accessing care in a timely manner.
There is no national health insurance system in this country and
no cognizable legal duty of the federal government to provide health
care for all citizens. 72 Instead there is a patchwork of private and
public health care, as well as, limited local and federal mandates to
provide health care for certain groups of people. The U.S. health
delivery system relies heavily on private insurance that people are
expected to obtain through their employment, school, individually, or
Many people are uninsured, either because
some other association.
they are not eligible for insurance, employers do not offer it, or the
For people who cannot obtain
insurance is prohibitively expensive.
private health insurance, they must rely on the public "safety net."
There are significant gaps within the health care safety net
because of this patchwork of private and public health care delivery.
72

Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) ("[tjhe Constitution imposes no obligation

on the [government] to pay ... any of the medical expenses of indigents.")
73 Stephen H. Long, Public versus Employment-related Health Insurance:
Experience and Implicationsfor Black and Nonblack Americans, in HEALTH POLICIES
AND BLACK AMERICANS 200-01 (David P. Willis ed., 1989).
74

See id.
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Much of the role of direct care provision and the doling out of
resources is left to the states. Many states have enacted laws that
obligate local entities to ensure health care access for its indigent
citizens, although such laws typically do not define the minimum level
of care required nor do they require local governments to provide this
care directly. 75 While public hospitals are one means to satisfy this
obligation, courts allow local governments to rely heavily on private
health care providers, facilities, and managed care plans to provide the
requisite care. 76 Gaps remain because while public hospitals have a

duty to provide care regardless of one's ability to pay, private
providers, such as hospitals, nursing homes, outpatient centers, health
clinics, and physicians, do not. 77 There are limited exceptions. For
example, federal law requires hospitals that participate in the Medicare
program and have an emergency room to provide a screening and
stabilizing treatment for anyone who comes to the emergency room,
regardless of their insurance status or ability to pay.78 However, this
law does not create a duty to provide nonemergency care. Many
hospitals are also tax-exempt, which means they receive state and
federal tax benefits in exchange for some community benefit or
charitable purpose they serve. Although this federal charitable
requirement has been interpreted to embody a free care requirement,
this interpretation has been significantly undermined.79 States vary in
75 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000.
76 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1442.5 (2000) ("....the county shall
provide for the fulfillment of its duty to provide care to all indigent people, either
directly through county facilities or indirectly through alternative means") (emphasis
added).
77 See id.
78 An important, but narrow, exception to this rule is that hospitals with emergency
rooms have a legal duty to screen all patients for emergency conditions and then
provide stabilizing care, regardless of ability to pay. EMTALA requires all hospitals
that operate an emergency room and participate in Medicare and Medicaid to provide
a screening examination to everyone who comes to the emergency room, and if an
emergency medical condition is discovered, it must be stabilized before the patient
can be transferred to another facility. This applies to all patients, regardless of
insurance coverage or ability to pay. See Enfield & Sklar, supra note 32 (discussion
of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986).
79 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) which exempts entities "organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes...." While early revenue rulings suggested that hospitals must
devote some of its revenue to the care of indigent as a condition of tax exemption,
subsequent rulings seem to dilute this standard. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 83-157 (1983)
(upholding tax exempt status for a hospital that did not operate an emergency room
and usually referred indigent patients to another hospital).
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free care
the degree to which they are willing to define and
8 ° enforce a
status.
tax-exempt
of
condition
a
as
requirement
Although the federal government relies heavily on state
administration, planning, and design of health care delivery, it is
extensively involved in health care delivery through its subsidization of
states' health care programs, direct funding and tax subsidies to private
and public hospitals, and through limited social insurance programs
that help certain categories of the extremely poor, disabled, and
elderly. 8 1 Thus, the federal government is in fact a powerful financial
partner of the states and private health care providers. Through its
spending power, the government has the means and the obligation to
ensure that recipients of federal funding and subsidies provide care in a
nondiscriminatory manner. However, a canvass of the system of health
care financing reveals that the government has created a health care
financing system that exacerbates racial disparities, while
simultaneously abdicating its legal obligation to ensure that funds are
distributed equitably. To illustrate the government's active and passive
role in fostering racial disparities, I will use two examples: the federal
government's decisions in structuring and financing the Medicare and
Medicaid programs and its creation and administration of Hill-Burton
funding to hospitals.
B. Social Insurance: The Medicare & Medicaid Programs
The Medicare and Medicaid programs were enacted in 1965 and 1967,
respectively. Enactment of Medicare and Medicaid is credited with
helping to transform the U.S. health care system by encouraging access
82
for people who otherwise were not eligible for private insurance.
Medicare, in particular, is seen as playing a critical role in the
movement to eliminate racial segregation through Title VI. In fact, the
threat of exclusion from Medicare was initially used to force Title VI
compliance, enabling the successful desegregation of more than 1000

80 See, e.g., Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah

1985).

81 See infra Part II.B & II.C.
82

See Watson, supra note 35, at 1;

SMITH,

supra note 43, at 141. See also

KAREN

DAVIS ET AL., Health Carefor Black Americans: The Public Sector Role, in HEALTH
POLICIES AND BLACK AMERICANS 213 (David P. Willis ed., 1989) (noting that
Medicare and Medicaid, coupled with primary care programs, improved access and

health status for millions of Americans).
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hospitals in the first few years of the Act's life. 83 Despite this
promising start, the government subsequently made choices that
undermined the promise of both programs for racial minorities.
On June 30, 1966 President Johnson announced that Medicare
would begin the next day and "for the first time, nearly every older
American will receive hospital care - not as an act of charity, but as
the insured right of a senior citizen.'

84

What was not acknowledged,

however, was that because eligibility for Medicare was tied to payment
into the social security program, some older and disabled workers were
excluded, especially minorities. 85 This is because many jobs that
tended to be disproportionately populated by minorities, such as
cleaning workers, did not pay into the social security system.
Moreover, the pervasive history of employment discrimination against
minorities effectively excluded them from many of the jobs that would
have provided these benefits. 86 By 1976, the racial differences in
87
enrollment of minorities and nonminorities narrowed significantly,
but racial and ethnic disparities in access to care persist. 88 One reason
for the disparities is that Medicare beneficiaries remain liable for
significant out-of-pocket costs in the form of coinsurance, deductibles,
83

See

SMITH,

supra note 43, at 141.

See also Watson, supra note 35, at 210

(describing how Medicare and Medicaid helped narrow the racial and class divide that
previously existed).
84 See SMITH, supra note 43, at 115-16, 141-42.
85 See ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 37, 53-57.
86 See id. at 53 (explaining that some jobs that tend to be disproportionately populated
by minorities are excluded from the system). See also Long, supra note 73, at 203-04
(citing statistics that show black are more likely to be covered by public insurance
that non-blacks).
87 See DAVIS, supra note 82, at 226-228. Medicare was originally
divided into two
parts. Part A covers hospital, nursing home, and home health services; and Part B
covers physician, outpatient hospital, home health and some ambulatory services, but
Part B is voluntary: "Part A covers all eligible persons. Those covered under Part A
may voluntarily enroll in Part B by paying a premium. Nearly all beneficiaries
enrolled in Part A participate in Part B. Participation in Part B has increased
overtime, particularly for blacks and other minorities...The improvement in coverage
of blacks under Part B has been attributed to the growth of the state buy-in program
under the Medicaid program. This program permits states to pay the Part B
premiums, coinsurance, and deductibles for those aged and disabled on welfare." Id.
at 227-28.
88 See DAVIS, supra note 82, at 231-32. For example, disparities
persist in the use
and reimbursement of services among whites and blacks. Moreover, there are
differences in the rates of physician services used, which has been attributed to
minorities greater use of outpatient departments for primary care services. There is
also inequality in the distribution of benefits for skilled nursing care. See id.
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and excluded services. To the extent African-Americans are more
likely to have lower 89incomes, such cost sharing acts as a barrier to
necessary health care.
Medicaid helped fill in some of the gaps, however the structure
and financing of the Medicaid program presented other problems.
Medicaid eligibility was limited to only certain categories of persons,
like pregnant women, children, and the disabled, and only the
extremely poor of these individuals. 90 The consequences of the
eligibility lines drawn for Medicare and Medicaid meant that
minorities, the working poor, men and single women tended to be left
out of the system. 91 These groups were expected to obtain their own
insurance through employment, school, or the private insurance market,
despite the fact that these areas were largely unregulated and many
employees were either ineligible due to work status or were effectively
priced out of the market because of exorbitant insurance rates. Once
again, African-Americans and Latinos were more likely than whites to
fall through these gaps due92to unemployment or employment in jobs
that did not offer insurance.
There were also significant differences in the administration and
financing of Medicare and Medicaid that fostered racial inequality.
Medicare is a federal program that has typically been pretty easy for
patients and providers to negotiate. 93 Coverage determinations and
provider reimbursements have generally been timely and health care
providers have viewed Medicare patients as valuable clients from a
business perspective. 94 Medicaid, on the other hand, is a joint
federal/state program in which the federal government delegates
program administration and benefit determination to the states, with
little or no federal oversight. 95 In practice, Medicaid has been a
bureaucratic nightmare for patients and providers alike. Because
See DAVIS, supra note 82, at 233-34.
90 See ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 44-59.
89

91

For example, in 1989, only 36% percent of people under 65 with incomes below the

federal poverty level were covered by Medicaid. See ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 7071.
92 African-Americans and Latinos, in particular, are more likely than nonminorities
to
be uninsured due to unemployment or employment in jobs that typically do not offer
health insurance. See Randall, Racist Health Care, supra note 32, at 171.
93 See DAVIS, supra note 82, at 226.
94 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 18.

9' Id.
The federal government delegates most responsibility for program
administration and benefit determination to the states, with little or no federal
oversight. See ABRAHAM, supra note 18. See also DAVIS, supra note 82, at 220.
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Medicaid eligibility depends on financial need, it was initially
conceived and structured as an extension of the public welfare system with overburdened and inexperienced welfare workers responsible for
health plan administration. 96 This resulted in inaccurate and/or delayed
eligibility and coverage determinations that often prevented or
discouraged patients from getting needed services. 97 In fact, some
states' procedures were so confusing
and arbitrary, that they were
98
forced, through litigation, to reform.
Medicare has also historically been funded much more
generously than Medicaid. Medicaid reimbursement is universally seen
as woefully inadequate, and its financing is always in danger. 99 This
coupled with the structural difficulties in program administration create
powerful incentives for health care providers to refuse to treat or
severely limit their treatment of Medicaid patients, which
disproportionately affects minorities. 1° ° These problems have also
impacted the quality of health care delivered to Medicaid versus
Medicare beneficiaries in significant ways. As more physicians and
hospitals limited their Medicaid and indigent patients through
exclusions or by leaving communities with higher rates of Medicaid
patients, only a limited pool of providers willing to serve Medicaid
patients remain.' 01
This often results in substandard providers
delivering the bulk of care to Medicaid populations and creates a
second-class health care system for the Medicaid and indigent
population. 102

96 See id.

9' See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 18. In her chronicle of one family's
difficulties in negotiating the public health system, Abraham described how the
family didn't know that medical transportation was covered by Medicaid and another
public program until a social worker informed them, causing them to miss important
doctor's appointments because of a lack of affordable transportation. Even the social
workers employed to assist people in getting proper insurance and health care have
difficulty getting accurate information from Medicaid workers about patients'
eligibility and covered medical supplies. See id.
98 See id. at 52. The system was so bad at one point that Public Aid was forced to
change its spend down procedures because of a number of lawsuits requiring the
program to be administered more fairly.
99 See id.
100 See Watson, Inequality and Incentives, supra note 35; ABRAHAM, supra note 18,

60-76 (describing the problem of Medicaid mills).
101 See DAVIS, supra note 82, at 225-26.
102

35.

See id; ABRAHAM, supra note 18; Watson, Inequality and Incentives, supra note
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Despite the fact that the gaps in health access between different
races and classes were narrowed as a result of Title VI and Medicare, it
should not have been surprising that within two years of Title VI
enactment, "racial divisions were widening again."' 0 3 Numerous health
advocates and policy analysts have attributed this fostering of the racial
divide in large part to the problems of the Medicaid program. 104 In
essence, the government undermined its own tools for change by
creating a two-tiered system of care and by creating categorical
exclusions that would clearly harm minorities disproportionately.
C. Hill-Burton Funding
In 1946, there was a push by the administration and several legislators
for a national insurance system.105 Although this was not successful, a
much more limited program of federal assistance in health care was
provided through the Hospital Survey and Construction Act, also
known as the Hill-Burton Act. 1° 6 Through this Act, the federal
government supported states and private hospitals by subsidizing
was
Significant funding
hospital construction and expansion.
07
distributed to hospitals throughout the 1940s-60s as a result.
At the insistence of those who pushed for a more
comprehensive insurance program, Congress attached two conditions to
the receipt of Hill-Burton funds. The first was an anti-discrimination
clause (also known as the community service requirement) which
provided that hospitals agree to make their facilities "available to all
persons residing in the territorial area of the applicant without
The second
discrimination on account of race, creed or color.
103 See SMITH, supra note 43, at 143.
104 See Watson, Inequality and Incentives, supra note 35, at 217-218 ("[a]lmost from
the beginning, Medicaid reimbursement lagged behind both Medicare and private
insurance rates, and most private hospitals and physicians refused to treat or severely
restricted their Medicaid patients. As a result, Medicaid patients -- who are
disproportionately minority - still cluster in public hospitals and the few private
hospitals - some formerly all Black that welcome them."). See also Randall, Racist
Health Care, supra note 32; ABRAHAM, supra note 18.
105 See SMITH, supra note 43.
106 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2000).
107 See SMITH, supra note 43.
108 See SMITH, supra note 43. The statute provided that "[t]he Surgeon General, with
the approval of the Federal Hospital Council and the Secretary of Health, Education,
-prescribe
regulations
by
general
shall
Welfare,
and
(e) that the State plan shall provide for adequate hospitals, and other facilities for
which aid under this part is available, for all persons residing in the State, and
adequate hospitals (and such other facilities) to furnish needed services for persons
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requirement, known as the free care requirement, provided that the
hospital make available "a reasonable volume of hospital services to
persons unable to pay" with an exception provided in cases where it is
not financially feasible. 10 9 Once again, despite apparent promise, the
government undermined its own purported commitment to improving
access to health care for everyone.
The most obvious example of this is found in the text of the
original legislation. The government expressly sanctioned racial
segregation by recipients of Hill-Burton funds by including a qualifying
clause in the antidiscrimination provision that permitted hospitals to
provide "separate but equal" facilities for nonwhites."l 0 Ultimately,
this provision was challenged in 1963 and found unconstitutional in
Simkins v. Cone,111 commonly referred to as the Brown of health
care.1 2 The facts of Simkins also illustrate the extent to which
significant public funding had already been disseminated to hospitals
that overtly excluded or segregated minorities. In Simkins, plaintiffs
brought a constitutional challenge against two hospitals that denied
staff privileges to black physicians and refused to treat black patients
on account of their race. 113 The facts revealed that the hospitals
received significant government funding from their participation in the
unable to pay therefore. Such regulations may also require that before approval of an
application for a project is recommended by a State agency to the Surgeon General
for approval under this part, assurance shall be received by the State from the
applicant that (1) the facility or portion thereof to be constructed or modernized will
be made available to all persons residing in the territorialarea of the applicant;and
(2) there will be made available in the facility or portion thereof to be constructed or
modernized a reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay therefore, but
an exception shall be made if such a requirement is not feasible from a financial
viewpoint. 42 U.S.C. §291c(e) (emphasis added).
109 See id.
110 A qualifying statement was added to the anti-discrimination clause that read:
"but an exception shall be made in cases where separate hospital
facilities are provided for separate population groups, if the plan makes
equitable provision on the basis of need for facilities and services of
like quality for each such group." SMITH, supra note 43, at 47 (citing
former 42 U.S.C. § 291e(f); 42 C.F.R. § 53.112).
This was the only federal legislation explicitly permitting racially exclusionary
services throughout the 1900s. See SMITH, supranote 43, at 47.
1" Simkins v. Cone, 323 F.2d 959 (1963).
112 See SMITH, supra note 43, at 91-94.
13 Simkins, 323 F.2d at 962. One of the hospitals actually admitted a few select black
patients, on special conditions not applied to white patients. See id.
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Hill-Burton program. 11 4 The government had allocated over $1 million
in Hill-Burton funding to one hospital, which constituted
approximately 15% of its construction expenses, and almost $2 million
dollars to the other, which constituted about 50% of the cost of its
construction projects. 115 The court held first that there was sufficient
state action because of the intermeshing of state and federal programs
used to allocate resources for the promotion of health care access.' 1 6 In
light of this finding of state action, the court held that the separate but
equal provision of Hill-Burton violated the equal protection clause, and
thus directed the district court to enjoin the defendant hospitals
from
7
further discrimination against black patients and physicians. "
Although both Simkins and Title VI prohibited race
discrimination, minorities were still being excluded or segregated from
whites on economic grounds. The link between race and economic
discrimination was clear as early as the 1950s in those states that
enacted antidiscrimination laws that prohibited the exclusion or
segregation of minorities by hospitals. For hospitals that wanted to
avoid Title VI or state antidiscrimination law prohibitions, economic
proxies were used to exclude minorities, sometimes quite transparently.
For example, many hospitals required preadmission deposits that
effectively excluded Medicaid and uninsured patients, but applied the
deposits selectively to minorities." 8
In other cases, hospitals
constructed private rooms or wings of hospitals to separate the
privately insured and affluent patients from those who were indigent or
received Medicaid.'9 This had the visible effect of, and in some cases
114

See id. The defendant hospitals were also tax-exempt and thus subject to state and

federal charitable care requirements, See id.

...
See id. at 962-63.
See id.
117 See id.
116

"8 See Randall, Racist Health Care, supra note 32. For example, in Smith's book he
documents the reputation that one hospital had in 1967 refusing to treat black people:
"The parking lot was known sarcastically as the 'black obstetrical unit.' A number of
babies had been born in the parking lot, because the mothers did not have the deposit
needed to get admitted..... [At the same hospital, an investigation showed that "in a
number of cases, poor white people got "vouched for" and did not have to pay an
admission deposit, but poor black people did not ever seem to get the same
treatment." SMITH, supra note 43, at 168-69.
"19 In another accounting of the problems of health care in Chicago, Laura Abraham's
research revealed pervasive racial segregation disguised as economic discrimination:
As late as the 1970s, racial segregation had not been eliminated at
Chicago hospitals. Medical students at Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's
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was intended to, create a de facto segregation of black and white
patients within hospitals. 120
Thus despite Title VI, the Hill-Burton antidiscrimination and
free care mandates were critical for preventing race discrimination by
hospitals. The nondiscrimination and free care requirements provided a
powerful tool for combating race discrimination disguised by economic
proxies because it could be used to prevent the exclusion or segregation
of Medicaid and uninsured recipients without having to prove a racebased motive. Indeed, in light of the federal government's role in
structuring Medicaid and Medicare and its early discriminatory
allocation of Hill-Burton funding, it had a legal and ethical obligation
to use these requirements aggressively to ensure the equitable
distribution of hospital resources. Moreover, the legacy of de jure
discrimination against minorities in all sectors of the economy meant
that minorities were overrepresented among the indigent and Medicaid
populations, and economic proxies used to disguise intentional race
discrimination were pervasive. Nonetheless, the government abdicated
its obligation to allocate funding equitably and to ensure that the
recipients of these funds complied with the free care and
nondiscrimination requirements.
For example, the government
continued to allocate public funds to facilities that discriminated against
minorities, overtly and covertly, forcing advocates to seek help from
the courts. 12 1 In fact, the government ignored the free care provision
22
altogether until civil rights advocates discovered it in the 1970s. 1
In 1970, in Cook v. Ochsner, 123 a class action suit was brought
against ten New Orleans hospitals that received Hill-Burton funding.
The plaintiffs were Medicaid recipients and minority residents whose
Medical Center protested in 1973 that black obstetric patients, those
with good insurance as well as welfare recipients, were relegated to an
old, deteriorating building, while white women gave birth in a modern
wing of the hospital. Hospital officials contended that only black
Medicaid recipients were excluded from the new rooms because
Medicaid would reimburse only for the cheapest accommodations. The
students countered that the price differential existed solely to promote
segregation since the chargesfor the new and old room were only a
few dollars apart.
ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 118.
120 See Rice, supra note 15, at 894.
121 See SMITH, supra note 43, at 47.
122 See SMITH, supra note 43, at 47.
123 Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital, 61 F.R.D. 354 (1972). See SMITH, supra
note 43, at 170.
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incomes were below the recognized poverty level. 124 The defendants
included several hospitals that received federal Hill-Burton funding on
the condition that they would provide a reasonable volume of free
services to the indigent and make their services available to all in the
community, but had an explicit policy of refusing or discouraging
treatment of Medicaid patients. 125 The claim was later amended to add
the U.S. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Louisiana
Director of State Department of Hospitals for abdication of their legal
126
obligations to ensure compliance under the Hill-Burton Act.
Originally, plaintiffs sought to enjoin this discrimination under Title VI
because of the racial effects of these policies, but the Title VI claim
was eventually severed from the Hill-Burton claim. 127 The federal
district ultimately ruled that the community service or
nondiscrimination obligation prohibited hospitals from discriminating
against Medicaid patients and forced the federal government to finally
issue regulations regarding the free care requirement.' 28 While this
provided some guidance to hospitals and gave advocates a stronger tool
with which to police noncomplying hospitals, the government never
aggressively enforced these requirements.
In sum, the government, through policy choices about the
structure and administration of federal funding programs for health
care, effectively undermined its apparent commitment to racial equality
in health care access in several ways.

Cook, 61 F.R.D. at 355.
Cook, 61 F.R.D. at 355. Plaintiffs also challenged the hospital practice of
requiring admission by a private physician as having discriminatory effects. See id.
124

125

126

127

Cook, 61 F.R.D. at 356.

See

SMITH,

supra note 43, at 47.

Allegations of violation of the free care

requirement were ultimately settled by consent decree in July 1972.
128 See Cook, 61 F.R.D. at 356-358. DHEW promulgated regulations directing that
hospitals providing uncompensated service "at a level not less than the lesser of 3
percent of operating costs or 10 percent of all Federal assistance" for that fiscal year
will be "deemed in presumptive compliance" with the free care requirement. 42
C.F.R. § 53.111(h)(7) (2004). See also Cook v. Ochsner, 559 F.2d 968, 973 (1977)
(upholding the validity of these regulations). The court also interpreted DHEW's
regulations at § 53.111(a) as creating a twenty-year limitation on the free care
requirement. See id. at 973 (affirming the validity of this limitation); see also SMITH,
supra note 43, at 169-71.

1056

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[VOL.9.2:1023

11. ADMINISTRATIVE FAILURES IN TITLE VI
ENFORCEMENT & THE RETREAT FROM FACILITIES
PLANNING
The federal government has reserved a powerful administrative role for
itself in Title VI enforcement and as the overseer of state facilities
planning in the distribution of hospital resources, more generally.
Despite this reservation of power, the federal government undermined
its purported commitment to Title VI enforcement in two key ways.
First, through a series of actions that ranged from "deliberate sabotage"
to "shameful neglect," the government rendered the OCR ineffective in
civil rights enforcement. Moreover, the federal government not only
delegated its facilities planning power almost completely to local
entities, it made a conscious decision to further shift from a model of
active regulatory control of hospital distribution (the facilities planning
model) to one that would allow free market competition to essentially
determine the distribution of hospital resources. Both decisions had
predictable adverse effects on minorities' access to care.
A. The Impotence of the OCR
In its three decades of operation, an agency that had
originally defined its role as an advocate and prosecutor
had been transformed largely into a passive arbiter of
disputes that avoided taking sides. In the process, it was
transformed from a central, driving force into an
increasingly 2 isolated,
decaying part of the federal
9
1
bureaucracy.
As mentioned in the previous Part, the federal government initially was
aggressive in using the threat of exclusion from Medicare to eliminate
the overt segregation and exclusion of minorities from hospitals
receiving public funds. The federal agency responsible for overseeing
the administration of health care financing was originally the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW), which has
been reorganized and is now the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS). Pursuant to the authority granted under Title VI,
DHEW promulgated regulations that expressly prohibited the use of
criteria, methods, or choice of site location that would
129

See id. at 356.
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disproportionately affect racial minorities. 13 Title VI enforcement was
vested in the Office of Civil Rights, which was charged with the
processing of all complaints of discriminatory practices.1 31 Through
DHEW and the OCR, the federal government appeared to have a
powerful administrative arm through which to police public and private
hospital restructuring. This power was never fully actualized, however.
Despite the obligation to investigate complaints of discrimination
prohibited by the regulations, the federal agencies charged with this
responsibility were not equipped to adequately respond to complaints.
Minority communities falling victim to private and public closures
were forced to seek help from the courts, and once again, a court order
was required to force the government to fulfill its legal obligations.
In NAACP v. Wilmington, 132 a Title VI challenge was brought
against the Wilmington Medical Corporation (WMC) to prevent a plan
involving a closure of two hospitals in an urban community that was
predominantly minority and the relocation of key services exclusively
to a new location in a predominantly white, affluent area. 133 Plaintiffs
challenged the restructuring plan on the grounds that it would have a
disproportionately harsh effect on racial and ethnic minorities.' 34 Upon
receiving a copy of the lawsuit filed by plaintiffs, however, the U.S.
Secretary of DHEW failed to investigate or initiate any proceedings to
halt the relocation.' 35 In fact, DHEW had expressly approved of the
relocation through a process created under the Social Security Act and
136
unrelated to the specific question of Title VI compliance.
C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2).
28 C.F.R. § 42.408 (a) (2005).
132 Wilmington I, 426 F. Supp. 919 (D.C. Del. 1977) [hereinafter Wilmington I].
133 Id. at 921-922. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Federal Rehabilitation
Act because the plan would disproportionately impact the elderly and disabled
persons. See id. at 922.
134 See id.
130 45
131

135

See id. at 924.

136 See id. at 922. The court explains that "[t]he significance of § 1122 approval

reflects the narrow Congressional purpose of encouraging state and local health
planning efforts [by ensuring hospitals] that the Secretary will not later withhold
federal funds under Medicare, Medicaid, and programs for maternal and child health
services because the capital component of the hospital charges is the result of an
unnecessary capital expenditure. If WMC had not applied for § 1122 approval or if its
§1122 application had been rejected, it simply ran the risk of not being fully
reimbursed for services provided to federally assisted patients." See id. at 922. Before
they could accomplish the plan, however, they sought approval for the federal
government under section 1122 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. s 1320a-1). In
reality, the process for approval is delegated to local planning agencies, with final
approval required by DHEW/HHS. See id.
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Ultimately, the court had to force the OCR to investigate and collect
information necessary to assess the effects of the plan.' 37 At the
conclusion of the investigation, the court issued a temporary injunction
preventing closure.' 38 As discussed further in the next Part, the
relocation was eventually allowed to proceed based on assurances
provided by the defendant designed to minimize the effects of
closure. 139

Despite the courts' initial policing of the OCR, its record of
Title VI enforcement is still shameful. 140 As recently as 1999, a report
by the United States Commission on Civil Rights (the Commission) not
only confirmed many of the longstanding complaints lodged by
patients' advocates, it also issued a scathing indictment that concluded
that the structure and operations of HHS/OCR have actually
exacerbated racial disparities in health care.1 41 The Commission
concluded that "the timid and ineffectual enforcement efforts of [OCR]
have fostered, rather than combated, the discrimination that continues
to infect the Nation's health care system."1 42 The Commission found a
number of faults with OCR's operations: the failure to develop Title
VI guidelines and adequate policy directions; lack of a thorough preaward review process to ensure that prospective recipients of federal
financial assistance were in compliance with the law; infrequent post
award audits or onsite compliance reviews; growing complaint
backlog; and lack of an effective and comprehensive system for
monitoring corrective action commitment.143 Despite regulations
giving DHEW the power to prohibit acts that had discriminatory
effects, no strategy or tools were implemented to enable the OCR to
proactively police hospital restructuring or monitor the discriminatory
effects that might occur.
The most compelling part of this report, however, was the
conclusion about the cause of these flaws in OCR operations: the
underfunding and understaffing of the agency and inherent structural
id. at 925.
id.
139The Court found this compromise acceptable under Title VI, which will be
discussed further in the next section, but plaintiffs did not consider this a success.
140 See id.
141 See Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modem
137 See
138 See

Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the
Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 215

(2003).
142
143

See id.
See id.
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defects in OCR's relationships to the agencies that controlled the
administration of public funds. In short, OCR's flaws were really an
indictment of Congress' policy choices. Congress has never provided
adequate funding or staff for effective civil rights enforcement. 44 As
Wilmington demonstrated, the OCR suffered from a lack of personnel
with the relevant expertise to be able to gather and assess data
properly
45
occur.
would
that
effects
harmful
any
determine
in order to
The Commission also attributed much of the OCR's impotence
to the decision to lump all civil iights enforcement under one body and
segregate civil rights enforcement based on Title VI from the
administrative bodies that had the actual power to grant and revoke
federal funding. 14 6 Lumping all civil rights enforcement under one
body meant that health care got short shrift in lieu of the more visible
and contentious issues surrounding school desegregation.' 47 More
importantly, though, establishing OCR as a separate agency from those
administering federal funds essentially ensured that OCR would have
no real enforcement power since the power of Title VI enforcement lies
in its threat to withhold significant public funding. This choice has
been characterized as "a deliberate attempt on the part of some
members of Congress to eviscerate civil rights enforcement efforts."' 4 8
Indeed, it is the adversarial relationship between OCR and other
agencies administering funds which has not only impeded civil rights
enforcement, but which sends a strong message that the government
never intended to take its commitment to remedy disparate effects
144 As early 1966, each division of DHEW only had a "token skeleton" staff to handle

civil rights matters, and only a small skeleton staff operated out of the Office of Civil
Rights. SMITH, supra note 43, at 183. See Marianne Engelman Lado, Unfinished
Agenda: The Need for Civil Rights Litigation to Address Race Discrimination and
Inequalities in Health Care Delivery, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1 (2001) (noting that

"the dreadful financial and operational conditions within OCR are a fixture on the
landscape of government enforcement and not a recent development."). Despite the
obvious effect this has on enforcement, the problem hasn't changed. For example, in
its 1999 report, the Commission criticized the fact that OCR's budget represented just
.0054 percent of the entire HHS budget and that OCR had no separate budget for Title
VI enforcement. See SMITH, supra note 43, at 125.
145See Wilmington 1, 426 F. Supp. at 924.
146 See SMITH, supra note 43, at 183 ("[i]nitially, Title VI was the responsibility of the
assistant secretary of DHEW, with each operating division [such as Public Health
Services)] responsible for carrying out day-to-day enforcement.... In October
1967... DHEW reluctantly responded to pressures from these appropriation
committees and reorganized the Title VI program, centralizing it into a single unit.")
147
See SMITH, supra note 43, at 183.
148 SMITH, supra note 43, at 183.
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seriously. At each point that the OCR has tried to take a more
aggressive role in the monitoring of racial disparities, it was
hindered. 149 For example, early on, OCR officials called for the
collection of race data as a critical tool for Title VI oversight, but
HCFA resisted.150
In fact, the federal Health Resources
Administration, which actively worked to reduce excess hospital bed
capacity through hospital closings, was unwilling to press for the
analysis of racial segregation in patterns of local use of hospitals to try
to understand the effects of its policies and whether these decisions
served their purported goals of ensuring equal access. 151 The OCR also
fought for a prominent role in policing Title VI through the aggressive
enforcement of Hill-Burton's free care requirement. Although it was
able to influence standards ultimately promulgated,
it was never given
152
them.
enforce
really
to
necessary
power
the
B. Government Shift from Facilities Planning to Market

Competition
Throughout the 1960s and 70s, the link between racial equality and
aggressive facilities planning became clear. In fact, on March 14,
1980, Alan Sager, Ph.D. and Assistant Professor of Urban and Health
Planning, gave a statement to U.S. House of Representatives, Health
See Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 141, at 237-38.
0 See id.
151 See SMITH, supra note 43.
152 Smith provides a first hand account of the barriers to the aggressive use of Hill149

Burton funding in health care planning during the early 70s:
Hill-Burton had these two requirements, the community services and
uncompensated-care requirements, that were really dormant. We
waged an aggressive effort to have OCR become the primary
enforcement agency and to revise the regulations on [what these
requirements] entailed. Neither ... had been spelled out, and the
department wasn't paying much attention to it. In conjunction with
[the Health Resources Administration and HCFA] we developed the
formula for free indigent care. It was a mechanical formula....On the
community services side, where it had not been defined, the issues were
much more contentious .... We wanted community services defined in a
way that would give it real meaning: forcing facilities to provide
access to Medicaid and uninsured populations. In the end, we got
pretty much what we wanted on uncompensated care, and we got a lot
of good language on community services, but virtually no enforcement.
What we really lost out on was giving it any teeth.
SMITH, supra note 43, at 170-7 1.
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Sub-committee of the Ways and Means Committee, entitled "Urban
Hospital Closings in the Face of Racial Change."' 53 Sager made
certain recommendations for dealing with the hospital closure problem
based on his study of hospital closures. He advised them of his
findings: Hospital closures were a problem for minority communities
and the poor, in particular. Inadequate funding of health services for
the poor, coupled with economic pressures of hospitals to focus on
profit, encouraged closures of some facilities and expansion of others.
These closures not only had the effect of decreasing minority access to
care, but probably increased the financial burdens to Medicare and
Medicaid, further stressing our public fisc, and thus, the scarce
resources used as a safety net. As a result of these findings, Sager
concluded that greater economic controls and active facilities planning
were essential to achieving a more equitable distribution of hospital
resources.
Indeed, through its spending power, the federal government has
the ability to oversee state planning to ensure that resources are
equitably distributed. This power extends beyond just oversight of
Title VI compliance. For example, the statute creating Hill-Burton
funding for hospitals required states to submit a plan for approval as a
condition of receiving such funds that would assure an adequate
distribution of resources by the state:
The Surgeon General, with the approval of the Federal Hospital
Council and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
shall by general regulations prescribe ....
that the State plan shall
provide for adequate hospitals, and other facilities for which aid
under this part is available, for all persons residing in the State,
and adequate hospitals (and such other facilities) to furnish
needed services for persons unable to pay therefore. 154
Despite the reservation of administrative power by the federal
government to ensure Title VI compliance in the distribution of
hospital resources, it neglected this power and made policy decisions
that have exacerbated the problem of hospital flight and revealed a
conscious neglect of the devastating effects such closures have on
minority communities. For example, during the 1980s, the federal
government retreated from a facilities planning model, shifting to a
model of free market competition that could only exacerbate problems
153
154

See Sager, Testimony, supra note 15.
42 U.S.C. §291c(e).
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of racial disparities. 155 Moreover, during this time President Regan cut
Medicaid and other federal spending significantly, while the economy
56
suffered from a recession, accompanied by high unemployment.'
This resulted in more people becoming uninsured or relying on public
insurance, at a time when the public funding was being reduced, putting
greater strain on hospitals that served disproportionate numbers of the
uninsured and Medicaid beneficiaries.
As already noted, in a
competitive market, hospitals are forced to search out richer markets
and consider corporate strategies that will maximize profits. This profit
maximizing goal in the face of the increasing economic strain resulting
from constant cuts in Medicare and Medicaid, and further cuts in
resources allocated to the public safety net, encouraged hospital flight
from urban and predominantly minority communities. In the face of
increasing public and private hospital closures and the federal
government's abdication of its facilities planning responsibility,
minority communities and civil right advocates turned to the courts for
help.
IV. Civil Rights Litigation:
The Unfulfilled Promise of Title VI
As far as establishing national precedents or changing the
behavior of federal planning and civil rights agencies, the
results from the hospital relocation lawsuits were abysmal
from the perspective of the civil rights advocacy groups.' 57
As seen in Parts II and III, civil rights litigation has been instrumental
in forcing government accountability at certain levels: it forced the
government to set standards defining express legal obligations, as in
Ochsner; it forced the government to comply with express requirements
to investigate complaints of Title VI violations, as in the first phase of
Wilmington; and it prevented cases of intentional discrimination by
recipients of federal funding, as in Simkins. Thus, civil rights litigation
has been successful where there is evidence of intentional
discrimination and/or a complete abdication by the government of
action explicitly required by law. While Simkins, Ochsner, and the first
phase of Wilmington reflect some progress in fighting race
155 See McLafferty, supra note 17, at 1080.
156 See Long, supra note 73, at 206-08.
157

See SMITH, supra note 43, at 181.
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discrimination in health care, Title VI has not been as successful in the
hospital closure cases.
Title VI challenges to hospital closures are different because
they rely on the court taking seriously the disparate effects language in
the regulations as it is practically impossible to show intentional
discrimination by the bodies making closure or relocation decisions.
Moreover, where such closures are sanctioned by the federal or local
government, it requires the courts to step in and exercise independent
judgment about the merits of the decision in contravention of
government approval. Thus, the cases discussed above left open two
critical questions: to what extent must the federal government actively
use its facilities planning power to ensure the distribution of hospital
resources in equitable ways; and to what extent are courts willing to
serve as a check on the government's decisions in individual challenges
to hospital closures.
In this Part, I will review the courts' decisions in this area to
show how they have undermined Title VI enforcement by eviscerating
the disparate effects protection promised under the regulations.
Specifically, courts have done this by devaluing the harm alleged by
plaintiffs and showing undue deference to defendants' justifications of
closures. In order to flesh this out, I will look at two typical scenarios public closure and private relocation. While my analysis will draw
upon the decisions from a number of cases, I will focus my discussion
on two key cases - NAACP v. Wilmington, the first Title VI challenge
to a private hospital relocation to reach the courts, and Bryan v. Koch, a
Title VI challenge to the closure of a New York public hospital. These
cases illustrate that despite two very different approaches and degrees
of protection provided plaintiffs by the Bryan and Wilmington courts,
the ultimate result is the same - courts have created an almost
insurmountable barrier for plaintiffs challenging hospital relocations.
A. Typical Scenarios of Hospital Closure/Relocation
1. Private Hospital Relocation in NAACP v. Wilmington
In Wilmington, plaintiffs brought a Title VI challenge to prevent the
closure and relocation of hospitals owned by a private hospital
corporation, Wilmington Medical Center, Inc (WMC). 158 WMC
provided a major portion of the hospital care for New Castle County,
Delaware.' 59 In fact, WMC was the sole provider of tertiary care and
Wilmington II, 491 F.Supp. at 290.
"9 See id. at 294-95.
158
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almost the sole provider of obstetrical care.1 60 Three nonprofit
hospitals formed the center of its operations: the General Division, the
Memorial Division, and the Delaware Division - all located within the
City of Wilmington.1 6 1 It was 1the
largest provider of free care for the
62
indigent in New Castle County.'
WMC decided that a massive capital expenditure program was
required in order to modernize its facility, stay competitive in the health
care market, and increase the quality and level of care it was
delivering. 163 It adopted a plan entitled "Plan Omega," in which the
Memorial and General Divisions would be closed and the Delaware
Division (hereinafter referred to as the "City Division") would be
renovated, reducing the number of beds for downtown Wilmington to
250.164 As part of Plan Omega, a new sixty million dollar, 800 bed
tertiary care facility would be built in the Stanton suburb of Delaware
(the "Stanton or Suburban Division"). 165 A number of important and
high-need services would be terminated at the Delaware Division and
relocated exclusively at the new Stanton location, including obstetric,
high-risk prenatal and specialty pediatric, gynecology, and
hemodialysis. 166 Primary care clinics, on the other hand, would be
consolidated at Delaware Hospital, as would psychiatry, dentistry, and
some other services. 167
Phase I. In their initial complaint plaintiffs alleged that Plan
Omega violated Title VI because it discriminated against the poor,
ethnic and racial minorities. 168 Plaintiffs noted that the minority and
elderly populations were heavily concentrated in the City Division,
which also tended to be populated with a large number of low income
patients without access to private or public transportation to the
proposed suburban location. 69 Moreover, the communities in the City
Division had a disproportionately higher need than residents of the
160

See id.

161

See id.

162

See id. at 296.

163

See Wilmington 11, 491 F.Supp. at 302, 340.

164
165
166
167
168
169

See
See
See
See

id. at 298.
id.
id.
id.

See Wilmington H, 491 F.Supp. at 298.
See id. at 302-03. Seventy-two percent of the Black residents of New Castle lived

downtown and in the other areas served by the City Division, but only 14% of Blacks
lived in the areas served by the Suburban Division. The statistics are even more
dramatic in comparing the racial makeup of the potential in-patient population for
each Division. See id.
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suburban location for many of the services, such as OB and
cardiovascular services, which were being relocated exclusively to the
Suburban location. 170 In short, certain services were being moved 9.35
miles further from the people who needed them the most, but would
have no way of accessing them. 171
The court ordered OCR to investigate and ultimately OCR
agreed that the discriminatory effects of the proposed plan would
violate Title VI. 172 Despite these findings, federal funding was not
terminated and DHEW/OCR did not inquire about less discriminatory
alternatives; rather DHEW allowed WMC to continue with the Plan
subject to certain assurances.1 73 In particular, WMC agreed to provide
"free and adequate transportation" for patients, visitors, and employees
between the City and Suburban divisions. 74 WMC also had to make
assurances that it would not allow either division to become "racially
identifiable" and that it would direct resources for the complete
the
renovation of the City Division in such a manner as to prevent
175
location.
downtown
the
of
neglect
and
deterioration
ultimate
Phase II. The plaintiffs challenged this revised plan under Title
1 76
First, plaintiffs argued that despite some mitigation of
as
well.
VI
harmful effects, the increased distance and travel time would
effectively discourage needed care by the poorer residents and
minorities of Wilmington. 77 Moreover, plaintiffs were skeptical of the
financial assurances made by defendants to maintain the facility and
Second, plaintiffs challenged the
provide transportation. 178
fundamental unfairness of the removal of such critical services from a
high need, underserved community, especially in light of an alternative
plan that would have less discriminatory effects.' 79 In fact, the
plaintiffs specifically identified a plan that had been rejected by WMC
called Reverse Omega that would result in an 800 bed Delaware
Division and 200 bed Southwest Division that would keep most of the
beds in the community with the greatest need. 180 Finally, the plaintiffs
170

See id. at 308.
id.

171 See

172

Wilmington 1, 426 F. Supp. at 921-22.

173 Wilmington II, 491 F. Supp. at 299-302.
174

See id. at 302.

175

See id.

176 See id. at 308-3 10.
177 See id. at 308-309.
178 See Wilmington H, 491 F. Supp. at 327-28.
"9 See id. at 310.
180 See id.
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alleged that WMC failed to show an important enough justification for
its plan in light of the less discriminatory alternative. 8 '
After a lengthy consideration of the plaintiffs' allegations and
OCR findings, the court ultimately held that in light of the contract
assurances and free transportation negotiated by DHEW, plaintiffs
could not make out a prima facie case of Title VI violation. 182 The
Court went on to note that even if the plaintiffs could show a disparate
impact, the defendant had established that the restructuring served a
legitimate, bona fide interest because the less discriminatory
plan could
183
only be accomplished at significantly greater cost.
2. Public Hospital Closure in Bryan v. Koch
In Bryan v. Koch, 184 a Title VI challenge was brought to prevent New
York City's decision to close Sydenham Hospital in Central Harlem,
which served a population that was 98% minority (black and
Hispanic). 185 The mayor had appointed and charged a special task
force to "examine ways of reducing costly excess hospital capacity
'1 86
while maintaining access to high quality health services."
Ultimately, the task force recommended, and the city decided to replace
some hospitals, reduce bed capacity at others, and to close two out of
seventeen of municipal hospitals. 187 The closure of Sydenham was
challenged on the grounds that it would have a significant adverse
impact on blacks and Latinos. 188 Plaintiffs also sought a preliminary
injunction to temporarily enjoin Sydenham's closure pending the
outcome of the lawsuit or assurances by the city that the in-patient and
emergency needs of the minority populations would otherwise be
served.189

In stark contrast to Wilmington, the facts about the potential
impact of the closure are scarce because no OCR or HHS investigation
181 See id. at 339-45.
182 See id.
183 See SMITH, supra note 43,
184 Bryan, 627 F.2d at 612.
185 See id. at 614.

at 179.

187

See id.
See id.

188

There were three lawsuits relating to this preliminary injunction. In two of them,

186

the city and state of New York were defendants, as well as the State Health
Department. The federal Department of Health and Human Services was also sued
for failure to investigate the administrative complaint filed about the closure. See id.
at 614-15.
189 See Bryan, 627 F.2d at 614.
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had been completed. 190 Nonetheless, the 2 nd Circuit majority refused to
issue an injunction temporarily preventing closure, despite the lack of
data that should have been collected by OCR and that was necessary to
assess the magnitude of harmful effects resulting from the closure.' 9 1 It
affirmed the District Court's findings that there were only minimal
effects on racial minorities 9 2 and that the city's decision was justified
by a nondiscriminatory reason - the government's fiscal concerns. 193
B. The Failure of Title VI in Preventing Hospital Closures
In making a prima facie case for a Title VI violation, the plaintiff must
prove that an act, policy, or in this case site location, will have
discriminatory effects. This requires not only statistics demonstrating
that a particular race or ethnic minority will be disproportionately
affected, but that a significant adverse effect will result. Proof of
disparate effects merely shifts the burden to defendants to proffer
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision.
There are two key criticisms of the courts' application of Title VI to
hospital relocations/closures:
(1) the failure to properly value
plaintiffs' harm; and (2) too much deference and weight given to
defendants' justifications for closure.
1. Devaluation of Harmful Effects
Courts have devalued plaintiffs' allegations of harm in a number of
ways. Some courts have been outwardly hostile to disparate effects
claims, viewing intentional discrimination as the only basis for private
relief under Title VI. Bryan provides the most obvious example of this.
The District Court spent most of its opinion analyzing whether there
was intentional discrimination and questioning whether plaintiffs had
the right to use Title VI to seek injunctive relief without evidence of
bad intent.' 94 It devoted so little time to plaintiffs' allegations of
disparate effects that the dissent in the a pellate decision characterized
the analysis as "a mere afterthought."' 9 Even where courts appear to
take the disparate effects test seriously in theory, they have applied the
test in ways that devalue certain kinds of harm identified in Part I of
this article. First, courts create an impossibly high burden for plaintiffs
190 See
191 See
192 See

id. at 620.

'9'See

id. at 617-19.

id. at 616.
id. at 617.

194See Bryan, 627 F.2d at 624.
'9'See id.
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to recover, essentially requiring them to show that the challenged action
will result in complete foreclosure of access to care.' 96 In Wilmington,
for example, the court only seemed to view immediate disruptions in
hospital care as significant. The court focused on two issues: (1) Will
the relocation result in a foreclosure of plaintiffs' access to emergency
and non-emergency services? (2) If transportation will be a barrier,
how will this be fixed? Apparently, after their negotiations, DHEW
and the defendants answered these questions to the court's satisfaction.
On the other hand, anything short of absolute and immediate
foreclosure to hospital services is dismissed as insignificant or too
remote. The indirect behavioral, long term, or psychic harms identified
in Part I.A. of this Article have not been considered sufficiently
burdensome to constitute a Title VI violation. For example, allegations
that increasing the burden of time and distance would have the effect of
discouraging timely routine and preventive care were never really
addressed by the court. Moreover, the fundamental unfairness and
racial stigma arising out of a plan to relocate services from minority
areas with greater need, to a predominantly white area with much less
need, was also largely ignored. Finally, plaintiffs' concerns about the
ultimate "ghettoization" of the hospital leading to substandard care
were characterized as a "fanciful scenario."
Courts also underestimate the magnitude of the harm from
closure through uncritical acceptance of the mitigating factors offered
by defendants. In Wilmington, to the extent that the court considered
the plaintiffs concerns about the de facto segregation of care, the
deterioration of the urban facility, and the racial stigma that would
result from both, it seemed satisfied with the defendants' vague
assurances not to let this happen and by DHEW's purported willingness
to enforce these assurances. 197 The court's reliance on these assurances
was particularly troublesome in light of the OCR's inadequate
resources and of DHEW's initial neglect. Bryan provides the best
example of the courts' underestimation of harm in its discussion of the
City's claims that access to care will not be disrupted because other
hospitals can provide catchment for patients previously served by
Sydenham. The court focused only superficially on this claim and
failed to deal honestly with the limited ability and willingness of these
other hospitals to take more Medicaid and uninsured patients. Oddly,
the court relied on the unproven assertion that existing hospitals were
already treating a significant number of Medicare and Medicaid
196
197

See, e.g., Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
Wilmington II, 491 F. Supp. at 299-302.
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patients as evidence that they would continue to do so, which defies
both common sense and experience. 98 First, in treating Medicaid and
Medicare patients as synonymous in the eyes of providers, the court
ignored the pervasive problem of Medicaid discrimination, a critical
element of plaintiffs' effects argument. Moreover, even if it were true
that these hospitals already treated significant numbers of Medicaid
patients, experience shows that this would decrease, not increase, their
willingness and ability to absorb more Medicaid patients.
2.
Undue Deference to Defendants
In measuring the legitimacy and sufficiency of a defendant's
justifications for actions that have discriminatory effects, there are three
important issues to be addressed: what reason is important enough to
overcome plaintiffs' showing of harm; is the defendant required to
demonstrate that its decision was the least discriminatory alternative
available or that other alternatives were considered in the decisionmaking process; and how closely should the defendant's reasons or
processes be scrutinized.
In every challenge to a hospital closure or relocation, the
defendant asserts an economic justification for the closure, and courts
99
have been extremely deferential in finding such reasons legitimate.'
In Wilmington, for example, the defendant paints a picture of a hospital
fighting for its survival in a competitive market. In Bryan, the city
justifies its action as a way to conserve resources in the midst of a
budget crisis. 20 0 Defendants will usually also assert quality of care
justifications as well. In both Wilmington and Bryan, the hospital
suffered quality of care problems as evidenced by the condition of the
facility and problems with its accreditation. The defendants argued that
the closure/relocation would enable them to improve the quality of care
most efficiently by using the resources to construct newer and better
facilities. 2 ° '
Courts have differed as to whether defendants must consider
less discriminatory alternatives and the level of scrutiny to be applied to
the defendants' decision-making process. Bryan provides an example
of the most hands-off approach a court can take. In Bryan, the
government failed to investigate the likelihood that the closure would
reduce health care expenditures in light of the disruption to access that
198 Bryan, 627 F.2d at 617 n.2.

199 See Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI, supra note 107.
Bryan, 627 F.2d at 617.
201 Wilmington II, 491 F. Supp. at 297-298; Bryan, 627 F.2d at 617 n.2.
200
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would result and the potential shuffling of patients to more expensive
facilities. 20 2 The government also failed to consider whether less
discriminatory alternatives to closing the hospital existed, such as
merger or consolidation. 203 Although such failures undermine both the
rationality and substantive legitimacy of the City's decision, the
majority nonetheless deferred to the City. It seemed satisfied that there
was some decision-making process, and it gave only token
consideration to the form and criteria used to decide which hospital to
close. In fact, the Bryan court explicitly ruled that Title VI does not
"require[] consideration of alternatives beyond an assessment of all the
municipal hospitals in order to select one or more for closing. 2 °4
While a somewhat more protective approach was used in
Wilmington, it effectively led to the same result. The Wilmington court
suggested that the defendant did have a duty to consider whether less
discriminatory alternatives exist to meet the stated goals.20 5 As part of
its analysis, the court found it relevant that a less discriminatory
alternative had been considered and rejected by the defendant hospital
corporation. Nonetheless, the court noted that the burden of persuasion
remained on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's justification was
mere pretext or that the less discriminatory alternatives would be able
to serve the defendant's purported goals.2 °6 In its analysis, the court
was quite deferential to defendants.
For example, despite the fact that a less discriminatory
restructuring plan was available, WMC justified its rejection of this
alternative based on its cost.
The OCR never investigated the
defendants' assertions about the cost differentials between the two
plans, however. 20 7
Moreover, during trial, plaintiffs introduced
persuasive evidence that the defendants had significantly overestimated
the cost of the alternative plan. 208 While the court acknowledged the
possibility that defendants overestimated the cost, it also found that
plaintiffs' estimates were likely too low because of errors in
assumptions made in its calculations. 20 9 Rather than require defendants
to provide accurate calculations to support their cost justifications, the
202
203
204

Bryan, 627 F.2d at 625-28.

See id.
Id. at 619.

205 Wilmington I,491 F. Supp. at 314-15.
206 See id.
207 See id.
208 See
209 See

id. at 343-45.
id.
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court simply deferred to defendants' belief that the cost differential
was
210
significant enough to forego the less discriminatory alternative.
Such deference only makes sense if one is simply trying to
ensure that there is no "bad motive" or intentional race discrimination,
without regard to a balancing of the importance of the defendant's
justification against the magnitude of the harm. The Bryan court
admitted this focus on motive and gave only token consideration to the
disparate effects claim. In the court's analysis of the magnitude of the
harm, it admitted that it could not assess the accuracy of the city's
claims that any harm would be mitigated by other hospitals in the area.
The court was satisfied that the defendant's decision to close Sydenham
"was made not only rationally, but with sufficient concern for likely
consequences.,, 2 11 This sounds like a classic test to determine whether
a defendant's reasons are merely a proxy for bad motive; not an
independent scrutiny of the reasons to determine whether they are
important enough to overcome the evidence of disparate effects.
Thus, despite explicit regulatory protections against neutral
actions that have discriminatory effects, evidence of significant short
and long term disruptions in access to health care that result from
discriminatory closures, and severe lapses by private and public actors
in their decision-making process and economic justifications for
closure, courts have applied Title VI in ways that have prevented any
meaningful relief for plaintiffs. Courts have followed the path of
disparate effects claims generally, by effectively foreclosing relief for
plaintiffs absent proof of intentional discrimination.
C. The Implications of Blaming & the Devaluation of
Plaintiffs' Harm
Complaints about courts' search for a "bad motive" or "blameworthy"
defendant in civil rights challenges is not unique to health care. A
common criticism levied at the courts in civil rights generally, and
specifically, in the hospital closure cases is the failure to apply a legal
standard that is faithful to the intent of Title VI and its implementing
regulations.
The implications of this construct are particularly
dangerous in hospital relocation cases for the reasons identified in Parts
I-III of this Article. The underfunding of health care for the indigent,
the economic and racial disparities fostered through differential
treatment of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, and the significant
gaps in the public-private patchwork delivery system make it
210 Wilmington II, 491 F. Supp. at 343-45.

211

Bryan, 627 F.2d at 617 n.2.
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impossible to identify any particular actor as "blameworthy" or as not
reacting to real economic pressures created by this system. Indeed, we
see the opposite occurring - courts are using these factors to shield
defendants from responsibility, while at the same time ignoring these
factors in assessing the magnitude of the harm that will be suffered by
plaintiffs. This shielding obscures legitimate policy reasons for holding
public and private hospitals more accountable to these underserved
communities, even though they may not have evidenced bad motive
deserving of blame.
While applying an improper legal standard obviously makes
plaintiffs' challenges much less likely to succeed, a closer look at the
courts' opinions in this area reveals a struggle that can not necessarily
be fixed by tweaking the legal standards used. I believe that what is
going on is the courts' deeper frustration with what it perceives to be an
impossible task - that is defining and enforcing the federal
government's obligation of racial equality within a health care system
that has been created and maintained in a way that fosters economic
and race discrimination and is, therefore, inherently incompatible with
racial equality. This struggle is clearest in the apparently inconsistent
treatment by courts of the economic elements of the hospital relocation
problem: that is the problem of the underfunding of health care for the
poor generally and how that informs the courts view of plaintiffs'
allegations of harm versus defendants' justifications for closure.
1. Economics as a Shield from Blame
Measuring the harmful effects of the closure, as well as understanding
the reasons underlying such closures, depends in large part on
assumptions about other actors in the health care system. The impact
of multiple actors and forces in this patchwork system make it
impossible to find a blameworthy defendant. In fact, the opposite
feeling is engendered -the tone overwhelmingly is one of sympathy for
the defendant in challenges to both private and public hospital closures.
In Wilmington, the court took seriously the defendant's perception of
the economic pressures created by WMC's significant public function
in a system where neither the federal nor state government ensures
universal coverage, and where market competition for more affluent
patients was seen as critical to long term survival. 21 2 In Bryan, the
court painted the picture of a city "struggling mightily" to provide
health care for its citizens in the midst of a budget crisis and the
212

Wilmington II, 491 F. Supp. at 296.
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described closure as one of the many "painful steps" it had
undertaken.213
The problem is that the federal government enables local
governments and private actors to make decisions that do not appear to
serve the purported financial concerns and that are made without any
examination of, or concern about, whether affected communities will
still have adequate access to care after the closure. In Wilmington, for
example, the effects of closure, including the immediate disruption to
hospital services due to lack of transportation between the city and
suburban division, were not considered by the hospital or local or
federal officials, prior the court forcing OCR to investigate. In Bryan,
the city never considered other options to closure, did not investigate
the willingness and or capability of other hospitals to help serve the
affected community, and never sought assurances from these other
hospitals that they would treat the indigent patients previously served
by the public hospital being closed. Sadly, but predictably, one of the
hospitals that the defendants argued would be available to ensure
uninterrupted access to care for Harlem residents was later downsized
as well.214 In fact, Sydenham Hospital was merely one a number of
hospital facilities lost by Harlem residents in the course of a
"Manhattan-wide" plan for reduction in hospital bed capacity, where
the reductions tended to occur in underserved communities with the
greatest need and least resources.2 15
Moreover, courts fail to appreciate the obligations arising out of
the public-private and federal-state partnerships created as a result of
the significant public subsidies used to support these hospitals. Two
examples of this partnership, the Medicare/Medicaid and Hill-Burton
programs were described in Part II. Another significant form of public
subsidy, which occurs through tax-exemptions provided to nonprofit
hospitals at the federal and state levels, was described at Part I.A.
above. Despite the fact that hospitals have benefited significantly as a
result of this partnership, and have corresponding obligations as a
result, courts fail to hold hospitals accountable to the obligations they
213

Bryan, 627 F.2d at 614.

214 See Marianne L. Engelman Lado, Breaking the Barriersof Access to Health Care:

A Discussion of the Role of Civil Rights Litigation and the Relationship Between
Burdens of Proof and the Experience of Denial, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 239, 260-61 &
nn.68-72 (1994). See also Mussington, 824 F. Supp. at 427 (dismissed on procedural
grounds), aff'd, 18 F. 3d 1033 (2d Cir. 1994) (Title VI challenge brought to prevent
the relocation of obstetric, neonatal intensive care, pediatric and other inpatient
services out of the Harlem area).
215 Lado, Breaking the Barriers,supra note 214, at 262 n.72.
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voluntarily undertook as a condition of the benefits they receive. For
example, courts cite to the provision of charitable care by defendants as
further evidence of the degree of economic pressure that compels
hospitals to consider relocation, generating sympathy for the
defendants. They fail to account for, or compare the amount of charity
care delivered by the defendant hospitals against the amount of public
subsidies received through federal and state tax-exemptions, direct
funding for construction, the amount of its endowment, or the amount
of bad debt the hospital was able to write off on its taxes. In other
words, no assessment is done to determine how much of the "charity
care" is actually owed as a condition of the direct and indirect public
benefits received by the hospital. Focus on "blaming", therefore,
obscures other characteristics of our health care delivery system that
demand greater accountability by hospitals and increased enforcement
by courts. Indeed, the fact that such hospitals are part of a larger
patchwork of private and public actors should not lessen courts'
willingness to scrutinize the decision.
2. Ignoring Economics in Devaluing Plaintiffs' Harm
In contrast to the courts' willingness to consider economic factors that
generate sympathy for defendants, courts have been much less willing
to consider the impact of these economic realities in assessing the
magnitude of the harm to minority communities. In Wilmington, we
see this in the court's casual dismissal of the plaintiffs fear of the
ultimate "ghettoization" of the hospital through the inevitable draining
of hospital and primary care resources as a "fanciful scenario". In
Bryan, we see this through the court's irrational assumptions about the
ability and willingness of other hospitals to mitigate the effects of
closure. 2 16 Scholars and civil rights advocates who have identified this
problem of the court's devaluation of the harm have made suggestions
for reform based on one of two assumptions: either that the court is not
willing to properly balance the plaintiffs harm against defendant's
justifications as manifested by the use of improper legal standards; 217 or
216

Another example occurs in the Ochsner case where free care obligations under

Hill-Burton and nonprofit law have been used by advocates in conjunction with Title
VI to enforce civil rights. Rather than account the proven implications of indigent
care obligations for racial equality, courts have treated such claims as discrete claims,
forcing plaintiffs to confine fit their argument in one of two very narrow boxes.

217 See, e.g., Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI
Defending Health Care
Discrimination - It Shouldn't be so Easy, 58 FORD. L. REv. 939, 975-78 (1990)

[hereinafter Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI] (arguing that the defendant should bear
the burden of showing that the challenged practice significantly furthers an important,
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that courts have been unable to fully appreciate the harm because of a
lack of fully developed sociological evidence about the type and
magnitude of the effects of these closures for minority communities. 218
However, the Wilmington and Bryan opinions reveal that there
may be an additional problem that is driving the courts' apparent
disregard of these effects which can not necessarily be fixed by
changing the legal standard or introducing more comprehensive
evidence of harm. Rather than failing to appreciate these economic
realities, courts seem to be responding to what they perceive is an
impossible task precisely because of these economic realities: namely,
the struggle with how to identify and remedy a civil rights violation
premised upon an unequal allocation of resources when no clear
minimal level of care or definition of equality is provided and where
the federal government has itself sanctioned and exacerbated disparities
in insurance coverage, which contribute to the hospital relocation
problem.
Once again, Bryan provides the clearest example of this in its
justification for its extremely deferential approach to hospital closure
cases:
We are skeptical of the capacity and appropriateness of
courts to conduct such broad inquiries concerning
alternative ways to carry out municipal functions. Once a
court is drawn into such a complex inquiry, it will
inevitably be assessing the wisdom of competing political
and economic alternatives. Moreover, such policy choices
would be made without broad public participation and
without sufficient assurance that the alternative selected
will ultimately provide more of a benefit to the minority
population.21 9
While the Wilmington court seemed to take its task more seriously, it
still openly struggled with the problem of how to measure equality in
health care and what level of inequality is "justifiable" in light of
certain economic realities. For example, in response to plaintiffs'
legitimate program objective, which cannot be substantially accomplished through
less discriminatory means; also arguing that the defendant should be required to
provide empirical evidence of the former assertion). See also Randall, Racist Health
Care, supra note 32, at 190-92.
218 See, e.g., Lado, Breaking the Barriers,supra note 214, at 266-68.
219 Bryan, 627 F.2d at 619.
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concerns about the unfairness and stigma created by relocating services
from a high need minority community to a more affluent,
predominantly white area, in the face of a less discriminatory option,
the court answered, with an almost helpless tone it seemed, that
equality of race does not mean equal resources and that equality does
not mean exactly equal. Moreover, the court expressed the same
concerns as the Bryan court that Title VI might be used to create a legal
obligation to guarantee some standard of care that does not currently
exist, and the court seemed to fear too much responsibility for setting
this standard:
While the plaintiffs' evidence and the seriousness of the
possible consequences of error might lead the Court, if it
were a member of WMC's administration or board, to take
a hard second look at the plan, the Court refuses to construe
the civil rights statutes as a license for this Court to act as a
financial overseer to those who provide services to
minorities. It would especially hesitate to assume that role
in a case such as this, where the sanctions available to the
Court could be applied by the market place as effectively
and certainly with more accuracy. 220
The last part of this quote is particularly troublesome because it ignores
overwhelming evidence that allowing the market, as opposed to
aggressive facilities planning, to determine the distribution of hospital
resources actually increases the likelihood of closures in minority
communities.
When faced with the challenge to second-guess
government action and define what level of disparity violates Title VI,
courts have essentially thrown up their hands and refused to scrutinize
the government's resource decisions.
The first four Parts of this Article show that the problem of
hospital relocations and closures present a complex and very frustrating
puzzle. A story is revealed, not simply about the discrete problems of
racial inequality in access to health care, but of the more fundamental
problems of our notion of civil rights. The hospital relocation problem
illuminates the disconnect between our Title VI legal construct and the
reality that minority communities face as victims of an inherently
unequal health care system. It also raises our awareness of the psychic
harm these communities suffer as they experience feelings of
220

Wilmington II, 491 F. Supp., at 328.
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helplessness, dehumanization and anger as critical hospital resources the lifelines of their communities - are being taken away by local
planning agencies and private hospitals subsidized by public funding,
while the federal government and courts allow it to happen.
V. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS:
THE REAL EFFECT OF OUR EXISTING CIVIL RIGHTS
FRAMEWORK ON HEALTH CARE ACCESS
The Brown decision[s] invalidated 'separate but equal,'
replacing it - as civil rights advocates urged - with 'equal
But given the continued motivations for
opportunity.'
racism, society has managed to discriminate against blacks
as effectively under the remedy as under the prior law more effectively really, because discrimination today is
covert, harder 22to1 prove, its ill effects easier to blame on its
black victims.
Could the above quote about the effects of Brown be true for
discrimination in health care? Have we indeed made it easier to
discriminate by making it more difficult to fight discrimination? This
is a harsh indictment of our current civil rights paradigm, but one which
we see revealed through the hospital closure problem. Indeed this
article was born out of a desire to understand how a problem as
pervasive as hospital flight from minority communities is still largely
ignored in the discussion of racial inequality in health care, and more
specifically, whether the unfulfilled promise of Title VI could be
revived to help plaintiffs fight racial inequality resulting from
increasing numbers of private and public hospital closures. The
organizers of the symposium where I presented this paper expressed
this concern in a much simpler and more powerful way, entitling my
panel: Is Civil Rights Law Dead? When this question is raised, the
focus is usually on the litigation part of the civil rights framework,
though, as Parts I-IV demonstrate, all three parts play an important role
in understanding the failures of our civil rights framework.
In one of the few articles considering hospital relocations from
a civil rights perspective, a civil rights advocate with experience
litigating Title VI challenges to prevent hospital closures identifies
three important purposes that such litigation can serve:

221

Wilmington 11, 491 F. Supp., at 328.
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First, and, perhaps most importantly, as individual
challenges to discriminatory or exclusionary practices,
lawsuits bring relief to a plaintiff or group of plaintiffs.
Second, suits build a record of discriminatory and
exclusionary practices, a record that can be used by
advocates to educate the public and to support legislative
and administrative change. ... Third, collectively, these suits
constitute a direct assault on the wall separating care for
individuals of different racial or ethnic backgrounds and
different income levels. This third point, in essence,
suggests that enforcement of civil rights and accessoriented laws will help to undermine the viability of the
current separation between the high-tech, quality care that
wealthy, middle-class and predominantly white America
has come to expect and the underfinanced, inadequate and
delayed health services' 222so often provided to the poor and
many people of color.
By all three measures, one might be tempted to argue that civil
rights law as an effective tool for change is indeed dead. First, in
almost every challenge to a hospital closure case that has been brought,
plaintiffs have lost.22 3 The numbers of private and public closures
plaguing underserved areas throughout the U.S, coupled with studies
reporting the widening of race disparities in health status and access,
222

Lado, supra note 214, at 254-56.

223

See Mussington, 824 F. Supp. at 427 (dismissed on procedural grounds); Heath v.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp., 681 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1982) (Circuit court vacated the
district court's injunction blocking closure of a hospital serving the predominantly
black community of Charlotte, North Carolina); Bryan, 627 F.2d at 612; Wilmington
1/, 491 F. Supp at 290; U.S. v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Tex. 1980)
(challenge to the proposed closure of inpatient maternity services of an inner-city
public hospital serving predominantly low-income, Latino residents); Jackson, 476 F.
Supp. at 896 (holding that the consolidation of hospital services did not foreclose
plaintiffs' access to care). But see Terry v. Methodist Hosp. of Gary, Nos. H-76-373
and H-77154 (N.D. Ind) (consent decree entered into on June 8, 1979) (discussed in
Lado, Breaking Barriers, supra note 214, at n.72 and SMITH, supra note 43, at 177178). After a partial relocation of services led to a deterioration of the inner city
facility, plaintiffs sued DHEW and the hospital and a consent decree was entered into
in which major renovations would occur at the inner city facility. While this was an
important challenge to the unequal distribution of resources, the fact that there was
also evidence of overt racial segregation of room assignments probably weighed
heavily in the plaintiffs' favor. See id.
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suggest little effect on the disparities resulting from economics and
race. Certainly, the protests of King/Drew's closure is one of many
examples showing that minority communities do not perceive that civil
rights laws have helped to guarantee equality in public resources.
Second, despite proven links between the underfunding of
services for the poor as a cause of increased hospital closures, on the
one hand, and the exacerbation of racial disparities and the increasing
strain our health care resources that result from hospital closures, on the
other, we still have not seen a coordinated or sustained movement for
legislation that would ensure everyone adequate health insurance and
access to quality health care. On the contrary, we continue to see
government cuts in health care funding for the poor and other health
policy decisions that result in increasing numbers of uninsured.224
Finally, the Supreme Court recently issued a ruling that
jeopardizes even the small leverage communities gained from Title VI
challenges to hospital closures. 225 In Alexander v. Sandoval, the
Supreme Court sent chills through the spine of the civil rights
community when it held that Title VI does not provide a private right of
action to enforce regulations that prohibit facially neutral actions which
have disparate effects. 226 In Sandoval, respondents brought a class
action to enjoin the Alabama Department of Public Safety's decision to
administer state driver's license examinations only in English.227
Respondents argued that the department's policy violated regulations
promulgated pursuant to Title VI because it had the "effect" of
224

See generally Rosenbaum & Teiltelbaum, supra note 141.

The authors note

another "egregious example of rules that foment discrimination.... [such as] a
proposed rule issued by the Bush Administration in August 2001, that would reverse
an earlier Medicaid managed care rule promulgated by the Clinton Administration.
The earlier rule prohibited state agencies from maintaining contracts with Medicaid
managed care organizations and entities that maintained segregated provider networks
(i.e., separate networks based on source of payment). The intent of this earlier rule
was to prevent participating entities from excluding members from certain portions of
their network and (at least by logical extension), as a means of discouraging managed
care entities from contracting with health providers that refuse to treat Medicaid
This type of exclusionary and segregating practice bears striking
patients).
similarities to the older and well-documented practices involving segregated hospital
floors, segregated medical staffs, and segregated nursing home wings, all of which
unquestioningly violate Title VI." Id. at 236-37.
225 See generally id.
226

Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). See also Rosenbaum & Teiltelbaum,

supra note 141, at 238-39.
227 See Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582
(1983).
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discriminating against non-English speakers on the basis of national
origin. The Court distinguished between the statutory language and
regulations, viewing the regulatory obligations set forth as simply
expanding administrative agency power, but not creating an
independent private right of action. 228 The decision was particularly
shocking in light of the fact that only two years before, the Commission
issued its scathing report documenting the OCR's "shameful neglect"
and structural deficiencies that undermined its efficacy, proving the
importance of courts as a check on government accountability. 229
After seeing how all three parts of our Title VI framework
combine to essentially shield defendants from any accountability and
foreclose plaintiffs' relief in hospital relocation cases, however,
perhaps the question should not be whether civil rights law is dead.
Perhaps the question should be whether the assumptions underlying our
existing health care system and civil rights framework, assumptions
very much alive and well, serve to foster racial disparities, while public
and private actors hide behind a mask of legitimacy created through
superficial Title VI protections. 230 As devastating as the effects of
individual hospital closure or relocation cases are, the assumptions
underlying the legal principles developed in these cases seem to infect
our discourse about civil rights and equality in health care in far more
insidious ways. Defects in the existing structure of antidiscrimination
law can impede the struggle for true equality in light of the function
law serves in society as not only "reflect[ing] dominant societal moral
positions, but also serv[ing] as part of the process of forming or
crystallizing such positions. ' ' 23 1 Ironically, though health care is one of
228 Alexander,

532 U.S. at 275. Previously it had made such a distinction for money

damages, but had not done so for injunctive relief.
229 See Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 141, at 231.
230 DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL:

THE PERMANENCE OF

RACISM 104 (1992). Indeed, in individual cases, defendants point to any process
undertaken to evaluate the closure decision as evidence of good faith, and then rely
administrative and judicial decisions in their favor as proof that their actions are
substantively legitimate and consistent with goals of racial equality. Plaintiffs, on
the other hand, are left feeling frustrated and angry at the process, as well as fearful of
the disruption in access to care certain to result. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 43, at
180 (describing the defendant hospital's characterization of the result in the challenge
to a hospital relocation).
231
Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L.

REv. 1049, 1051 (1978) ("Given a view that law serves largely to legitimize the
existing social structure and, especially, class relationships within that structure, the
ultimate constraints are outside the legal system. But if law is to serve its legitimating
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the least talked about areas in civil rights jurisprudence, the hospital
relocation problem provides one of the clearest examples of these
dangerous effects.
In their rejection of Title VI challenges to hospital closures,
courts have crystallized several assumptions that infect our current
discourse in ways that impede meaningful reform. First, the search for
a "bad motive" or blaming in place of a true disparate effects test
diverts our attention from the lapse in government accountability and
its conscious neglect of racial inequality. Second, ignoring the
intersection between race and economics so critical to defining and
addressing the inequitable distribution of hospital resources affirms an
ideology inherent in the structure of our health, political, and judicial
system that is incompatible with racial equality in health care. That is,
it affirms an ideology that sanctions economic discrimination and
market competition as a fair way to regulate the distribution of health
care resources. This discourages an honest critique of the forms and
effects of race discrimination in our health care system, which, in turn,
impedes our ability to identify and construct the kind of creative and
radical approaches needed to reform the system.
Finally, the
affirmation of these principles also creates process-oriented barriers to
the development of an empowered, community-driven reform effort. It
encourages divisiveness by focusing our attention on points of conflict,
rather than common interests that should be used to build powerful
coalitions across many different groups.
A. Implications of a Blaming Paradigm
The effects of a "blaming" framework extend beyond the individual
cases that plaintiffs have lost, infecting our discourse about equality in
health care in dangerous ways. This is evident in the contrast between
our willingness to express outrage at overt acts of racism and our lack
of outrage about the government's active role in creating a system that
is patently incompatible with racial equality. In 2002, Trent Lott made
the infamous statement apparently expressing support for Thurmond's
segregationist platform back in 1948. There was an outpouring of
anger and calls from the black community demanding his resignation.
More recently, Bill Bennett, the former Education Secretary, made the
comment that "if we abort every black baby, the crime rate would go
down."
Once again, public outrage was clear. These isolated
function those ultimate constraints must yield up just enough autonomy to the legal
system to make its operations credible for those whose allegiance it seeks as well as
those whose self-interest it rationalizes.").
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statements, while having little, if any, effect on the plight of minorities,
are obvious examples of the kind of racial bias that we abhor as a
society and, thus, are easy targets for "blame" and calls for punitive
measures. By contrast, there has been a notable lack of outrage about,
and attention paid to, the federal government's role in creating and
maintaining a health care system that fosters race discrimination.
Despite the fact that, the government, through its legislative,
administrative, and judicial arms, has made choices at critical junctures
that have knowingly undermined civil rights enforcement and revealed
a conscious disregard for the health and psychic effects on minorities,
criticism of the government's responsibility for this problem is muted
in mainstream discourse.
This muting effect may be due in part to the reality that health
care has traditionally not been treated as a priority among the list of
civil rights issues to be addressed. 232 Issues that impact minority
communities on a day-to-day basis, such as education, employment,
and conflict with criminal law enforcement get the most attention.
Health care does not rise to the same level of importance as these other
problems until a hospital closure makes it visible and minority leaders
become actively involved in ways that energize and give voice to the
community's concerns. Another reason for this muting effect may be
the localization of hospital conflicts. The federal government has
successfully shifted the focus of these disputes to the local level
through the delegation of its facilities planning to local agencies.
Hospital closure conflicts, as currently framed, pit local communities
against local hospital providers or local government officials making
the closure decision. The courts, in applying a traditional intent-based
analysis, look narrowly at this point of conflict and ask whether the
decision maker has a bad intent. This framework causes us to ignore
the importance of the relationship between the federal and local
government in facilities planning, and more specifically, the history of
conscious disregard of disparate effects on minorities at every level.
Rather, local actors are painted as victims - and this image is largely
reflected in our public discourse as well. The framework that has been
absorbed into our discourse equates legal responsibility with blame;
without the kind of incendiary statements given above that obviously

232

See, e.g.,

SMITH,

supra note 43, at 183 (explaining why the shift to a centralized

OCR at the end of 1967 resulted in a preoccupation with the more visible issue of
school desegregation, while health care received little attention).
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merit blame, society
is reluctant to hold the hospitals or government
233
accountable.
actors
Diverting attention from the government's own responsibility
allows it to continue acting in ways that are hostile to racial equality.2 34
For example, in 2001, the Institute of Medicine released the results of
its report proving that significant disparities still exist between whites
and minorities, both in terms of access to health care and health
status.235 Rather than responding constructively and thoughtfully to the
findings, government officials attempted to water-down the racial
implications of the report's findings.2 3 6
Moreover, despite the
documented links between an underfunding of health care for the poor
and the problem of urban and physician flight from minority
communities, 237 there is no government reform effort underway to fix
the current gaps in health care funding. Despite demonstrated links
between racial disparities in access to care, the structural and
operational defects identified in the OCR, and the federal government's
failure to use its facilities planning power to prevent the unequal
allocation of health care resources, Congress has yet to provide
adequate resources for the OCR or to become more involved 239
in
238 Despite calls by leading health law scholars,
planning.
facilities
233

See generally KOFI BUENOR HADJOR, ANOTHER AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF RACE

AND BLAME (1995).
234 The blaming framework created under our civil rights framework essentially

requires proof of intentional and conscious bias, which does not appear to be satisfied
by showing a conscious or reckless disregard of the harmful effects on a particular
racial group. Nonetheless, attempts to describe government action as "racist" yields
one of two reactions: either government actors take a defensive posture that ends any
discussion until one can in fact prove the actor's bad motive; and/or those actors
defending the government label such critics crazy or conspiracy theorists. Thus,
communities are in a Catch 22 because courts will not take plaintiffs seriously if they
cannot prove intentional discrimination by a discrete actor; however; in order to be
taken seriously in the larger discourse, we must speak in sterile terms about the
system, its unintended effects on race, and then fashion a response accordingly.
235 See Robert Steinbrook, Disparitiesin Health Care - From Politics to Policy, 350
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1486 (2004); Gregg Bloche, Health Care Disparities- Science,
Politics, & Race, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1568 (2004).
236 See Steinbrook, supra note 235, at 1486; Bloche, supra note 235, at1568.
237 See, e.g., Lynn M. Olson et al., Children in the United States with Discontinuous
Health Insurance Coverage, 353 NEw ENG. J.MED. 382 (2005).

See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS
REPORT: FUNDING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT (2005) (noting that in the
past 10 years, OCR has never received the level of staffing it requested from
238

Congress and that as staff has decreased, the pending inventory of claims has
increased). The report also noted that "[i]n 2003, OCR closed fewer complaints than
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health policy analysts, 2 4° and civil rights advocates 24 1 for broader
reform that would require race data collection and the aggressive use of
financial incentives to encourage providers to minimize disparities,
there have been no meaningful steps taken toward this end.242 In fact,
the government continues to cut Medicaid and resist suggestions for
comprehensive health care reform that would provide more support for
24 3
vulnerable populations.
At the same time, the federal government has tried to shift
responsibility for these disparities to other actors in the system. For
example, the OCR website contains information about the
government's concern and plan for remedying disparities by focusing
on research initiatives to investigate the role of genetics or cultural
factors in prevalence of disease and success of treatment. It also
highlights funding provided for community education efforts to
determine how minority communities' own behavior or mistrust may
impede their willingness to access care. I do not want to trivialize the
importance of understanding how patients' and providers' biases can
impact health care delivery. For example, some community groups are
very active in working with underserved communities to address this
issue. 244 Some physicians have also initiated important, self-critical

in the preceding year, which more than likely will result in the highest number of
backlogged complaints since 1994." Id. at 34.
239 See generally Watson, Inequalities and Incentives, supra note 35; Watson,
Reinvigorating Title V1, supra note 217.
240 See generally SMITH, supra note 43; DAVIS, supra note 82, at 244; ABRAHAM,
supra note 18.
241 See generally Lado, supra note 214.
242 Recently I hosted a managed care CLE program where we had representatives
from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and the Department of
Managed Healthcare. In response to my question about whether either department
had plans to require the collection of race data or incorporate financial incentives to
police managed care plans, both representatives were sincerely concerned and
thoughtful about the problem, but unfortunately the answer was no. A Los Angeles
Assemblyman was also on the panel because he had been working on a proposal that
would guarantee coverage for Californians through a model similar to the one used
for automobile insurance. He claimed to have a thoughtful proposal to help solve the
health care problem in California, yet he had no response to my question about tools
for monitoring racial disparities.
243 Robert Pear, Medicaid Commission Formed to Tame Program's Growth, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2005, at A11.
244 In California, the California Black Women's Health Project and Asian and Pacific
Islander American Health Forum are two examples of grass roots organizations that
are proactive in educating minorities communities about their health care rights.
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studies yielding evidence of subconscious bias based on race and
gender. 245
While such initiatives should be encouraged, they are not
substitutes for the government's responsibility to ensure equality in the
distribution of resources. Unlike the providers who are willing to
challenge their own biases or communities with scarce resources
willing to learn how to take an active role in their health care, the
government refuses to take ownership of its responsibility in creating
and perpetuating this problem. In light of the already large credibility
gap that exists, any government action that purports to address racial
disparities, but fails to acknowledge its own responsibility in fostering
racial disparities and encouraging hospital closures, is suspect and will
only generate further mistrust among minority communities.
B. The Segregation of Economics & Race
The failure of the court to acknowledge the critical role that economics
plays in assessing the magnitude of the harm resulting from hospital
closures in minority communities is also reflected in our broader
discourse. Sager's study of the hospital relocation problem led him to
the conclusion that "[u]rban hospital reconfiguration has manifested
and exacerbated problems that can be solved by legislating health
insurance coverage for all Americans."
The links between the
underfunding of health care, on the one hand, and poor health status,
less health care access, and hospital closures in minority communities,
on the other hand, should make it clear that legislating universal access
to health care is a necessary, though not sufficient, step toward solving
the problem of racial disparities.
A system based on economic
inequity in health care is incompatible with racial equality.
Despite these links, there is a lack of public outrage about the
fundamental inequities in the system or demand for fundamental
economic reform in health care that would guarantee universal
coverage, even by the minority communities most severely affected by
hospital closures. I am not arguing that the affected communities or
civil rights advocates are unaware of the intersection of race and
economics or that they do not understand the importance that resources
play in the fight for equality. Indeed, King/Drew proves otherwise.
However, what is visible in the vocal and angry protest of a particular
hospital closure has been missing in the mainstream discourse. There
245

Kevin A. Schulman et al.

The Effect of Race and Sex on Physicians'

Recommendations for CardiacCatheterization, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 618 (Feb. 25,

1999).
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does not appear to be wide support for a sustained, powerful, proactive
movement to redefine health care equality in this country in a way that
meaningfully embodies a resource component.
A couple of reasons for this were suggested above, however,
there may be an even more powerful reason highlighted by this tension
between race and economics. At a fundamental level, and despite our
recognition of the critical link between race and economics, we seem to
struggle in the same way that courts struggle in Title VI challenges to
define what is fair; that is, does society really embrace a notion of
complete equality?
Our own schizophrenia in this struggle has
surfaced when political leaders have criticized the underlying economic
structure of our system and demanded a universal health care system
that guaranteed access for everyone. Such leaders have either been
undermined, dismissed, or vilified for their attempts at fundamental
economic reform.
Society's own complicity in this regard is
highlighted in a book entitled, The System, in which the authors discuss
Clinton's failed attempts at health care reform. The authors recount
advice given to President Clinton by Jay Rockefeller, someone
considered a formidable advocate for universal health care.
Rockefeller assessed the public psychology of the issue:
Cost control is the reform Americans most need, want and
are willing to pay for .... Peace of mind follows cost control.
Voters fear losing coverage from loopholes, job changes,
layoffs or catastrophic illness.
Reform that makes
insurance more affordable helps allay this fear, but voters
want stronger safeguards.
Fear, much more than
compassion, drives support for universal guarantees of
coverage. * * *
[The statement that] Americans deserve or have a right to
health care is a dead-end approach.
Although many
Americans may initially react positively to this statement,
overtime it can make them uneasy. Before long they will
be asking: How would we pay for all that care for all those
people?
Won't it require a huge new government
bureaucracy? Is every American deserving?246

246

See HAYNES JOHNSON &

DAWD S. BRODER, THE SYSTEM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF

POLITICS AT THE BREAKING POINT

92-93 (1996). Indeed this seems consistent with

treatment of past leaders who attempted true economic reform in health care, often
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Indeed, as we saw in Part II, the question "Who is deserving?" seems to
underlie the inequitable structure of our social insurance system. 247 We
have been taught that economic discrimination is fair based in large
part on the myth that we live in a meritocracy where hard work and
productivity will be rewarded with material resources. 248 The logical
corollary: those without resources to access quality health care must
not have contributed their fair share. This ideology only reinforces our
willingness to underestimate the government's responsibility for the
barriers to access suffered by poorer, predominantly minority
communities. In a civil rights discourse that relies on blaming, we are
subconsciously, if not consciously, required to blame someone: if not
the government or the hospitals who are acting rationally to maximize
profits in a competitive healthcare market, then the affected
communities who failed to acquire the necessary resources to ensure
their access to health care. 24 9

C. Impediments to Coalition Building & Community
Empowerment
This framework has other potentially destructive effects in our struggle
for equality. First, by defining civil rights violations in such narrow
terms and distracting us from the critical goal of enacting meaningful
economic reform, the existing framework can create divisiveness that
impedes coalition building critical for this reform. 250 For example, the
focus on race-based motives in this context can pit different racial
groups against each other as they compete for scarce resources. This
triggers competition among vulnerable groups for scarce resources in a
system where government action and inaction is the real threat to the
limited safety net we have.
In this kind of environment,
antidiscrimination claims to resources may be viewed as claims for
special protection to a substantive right that is not guaranteed to all.
Indeed, courts have expressed this precise concern in justifying their
reluctance to use Title VI to second-guess government policy decisions
about how resources should be allocated.
being labeled as "communists" and Anti-American in order to demonize them. See
id.
247 See Smith, supra note 43, at 23-31.
248
249

250

See id.
See generally HADJOR, supra note 233.
See generally MANNING MARABLE & LEITH MULLINGS, The Divided Mind of

Black America: Race, Ideology and Politics in the Post-Civil Rights Era, in BEYOND
BLACK AND WHITE: TRANSFORMING AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS

(1995).
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Second, this focus on blaming can cloud our ability to identify
other groups as potential partners in health care reform. For example,
once we redefine the focus as one of fundamental economic reform, we
can identify other groups who are currently vulnerable to the gaps in
the public safety net, such as people with disabilities, the elderly,
women, and increasingly the middle class generally. Thus broadening
the focus of our reform effort allows us to broaden our coalition base.
The blaming framework can also perpetuate divisiveness among groups
that have traditionally been seen as hostile to minority communities'
interests, but who, in fact, have more in common as potential partners
in the fight for real health care reform. As I will develop more in the
final section, patients and health care providers have a significant
common interest in reforming the health care financing system. If we
only consider the problem from the point of conflict that arises between
patients, physicians, and hospitals in response to hospital closure
decisions, communities may fail to see how hospitals and physicians
can be powerful partners in a proactive fight for more comprehensive
coverage that could help prevent the problems that lead to such closures
in the first place.
Finally, because the existing Title VI framework has not
provided the promised protection to minority communities, it has
engendered mistrust and feelings of isolation that can lead to feelings of
hopelessness and discourage potentially beneficial public-private
partnerships. Encouraging communities' reliance on the existing civil
rights enforcement structure in light of the obvious and pervasive
defects in all three parts of this structure is tacitly enabling a system
that is inherently discriminatory and incapable of providing meaningful
remedies. To talk about civil rights in health care and the hospital
relocation problem, without addressing the fundamental reforms
necessary and without giving communities real tools to force
government accountability only reinforces these feelings of
helplessness, mistrust, and anger. This, in turn, can undermine the
psychological and emotional empowerment necessary for effective
grass roots advocacy in the fight for equality in health care.
VI. COURAGE & HOPE
I have spent most of this article showing how the hospital closure
problem reveals serious defects in our current civil rights framework,
which should trigger frustration and anger among scholars and
advocates on behalf of the communities who have been failed by the
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As shown above, our current civil rights

approach perpetuates the false separation between race and economics
in defining the problem, reinforces a health care system that is
incompatible with racial equality, and defers almost completely to
government agencies that have vacillated between overt sabotage and
shameful neglect of their civil rights duties. The hospital relocation
problem leads not only to racial disparities in health care access; it also
reveals the dehumanizing and stigmatizing effects that result from the
failure of civil rights laws to prevent hospital flight from minority
communities.
This has created feelings of hopelessness and anger
among minority communities who feel betrayed by the political,
judicial, and health care systems. As legal advocates, I believe we have
a duty to harness this anger and use it to empower communities to fight
to redefine our notion of civil rights in health care. To that end, I want
to spend this last part using lessons from the hospital relocation
problem to argue for a more comprehensive and creative plan of action,
and to explain why I have hope for the future, despite the significant
systemic and ideological barriers that must be overcome.
One of the simplest and most poignant observations about the
problems of King/Drew is by Assemblyman Mark Ridley-Thomas who
concluded that the problems of King/Drew are "Most fundamentally
[due to the lack] of resolve to address the issue creatively and
forthrightly. '
And this is where courage comes into play. Once we
define the problem honestly, this dictates the kinds of reforms
necessary for real change. While there are currently examples of
discrete groups working on creative ways to improve access for
targeted populations, one of the biggest problems is the lack of a
comprehensive approach that bridges the different communities and
areas in need and that empowers communities to attack the root of the
problem. Health and civil rights advocates have a critical role to play
in reforming our current ideological and structural framework for civil
rights in health care by forming bridges across populations (race,
gender, orientation, class); facilitating creative private and public
partnerships; utilizing traditional and nontraditional forms of advocacy;
and challenging even the most entrenched principles of our judicial and
political system that impede court willingness to check the
government's abdication of authority. In this final part, I want to
suggest some guiding principles in our ongoing attempts to do this.

251

Mitchell Landsberg, Why Supervisors Let Deadly Problems Slide, L.A. TIMES,

Dec. 9, 2004, at Al.
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1. Be Willing to Challenge the Fundamental Ideology
Underlying Our Current Notions of Civil Rights in Health
Care and the Enforcement Structure of Title VI
Legal scholars have tended to craft solutions to the problem of racial
disparities by identifying defects in our existing legal structure and
trying to fix them. For example, a number of scholars have noted the
importance of collecting racial data in order to monitor and ensure
compliance with regulations concerning disparate effects; however, it is
not clear how much help this would be in the face of judicial and
administrative hostility to these kinds of claims. Indeed, Wilmington
shows that even when courts were committed to reviewing such claims,
the evidence of disparate effects could still be easily overcome. Legal
scholars recognize this barrier and have also argued that the legal
standards applied to such challenges should be altered to better
accomplish the goals set forth in the Title VI statute and regulations.
Thus, standards should be used that value both long and short term
harms identified by plaintiffs and should factor in the reality of
economic discrimination that undermines defendants' claims that other
hospitals can mitigate any disruptions in access. Moreover, courts
should scrutinize the defendant's decision-making process and reasons
for closure more closely and shift the burden to defendants to show that
no less discriminatory alternative exists. 252 However, this proposal
does not take into account the fundamental struggle courts face in
defining what level of disparity constitutes a Title VI violation in a
health care system that fosters and sanctions disparities created through
economic discrimination. The same economic factors that plaintiffs
want courts to consider in measuring the magnitude of the harm, are
also relevant to the court's perception of the economic pressures that
incentivize the challenged closures, which make hospitals sympathetic
defendants. Courts view inner city hospitals as having to bear a
disproportionate burden of caring for the indigent - the federal
government increasingly shifting more of the burden to local
governments and federal and local government shifting responsibility
to the private sector. One gets the picture of a game of hot potato, with
the poor being dumped from place to place, no one willing to claim
responsibility for providing a system of continuous and consistent
quality care for everyone. Until we can change this aspect of the
system, other reforms will have limited effect.
252 See, e.g., Richard J. Zall, Maintaining Health Care In the Inner City: Title VI and

Hospital Relocations, N.Y.U. L. REv. 271 (1980)
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To that end, we must be willing to challenge certain ideological
barriers to a meaningful reform of our health care and civil rights
enforcement structure. Creating a system of universal health care is the
obvious place to start. However, we know from studies of other
countries that have universal health care that this is not sufficient to
ensure racial equality. Universal access cannot eliminate racial
disparities given the broader socioeconomic disparities within the U.S.
that affect minority health status 253 and the undisputed fact that some
race disparities can be linked to race bias or other non-economic
factors.
Without some mechanism for identifying and correcting
racial disparities in access and outcomes, a universal health care system
will also have limited effect. Thus, a mandatory race data collection
system designed to measure disparities in health access and outcome
should be part of any health system implemented.
2. Short Term Solutions & The Role of Legal Advocates in
Demanding Real Tools for Change
We can not and should not wait for the more fundamental health
financing and civil rights reforms above to occur, in order to fight
existing health care disparities. In the short term, communities can use
their political leverage to prevent hospital closures. Legal advocates
play a critical role in organizing and empowering communities to use
this power to publicly shame and hold local officials accountable for
decisions that adversely affect their communities. This approach has
had varying degrees of success in California. One successful example
occurred in the fight to keep Rancho Los Amigos open, a rehabilitation
hospital whose closure would have disproportionately harmed disabled,
indigent, and minority patients. 255 Disability and health care advocates
were able to secure an agreement by the County to keep it open for at
least another three years. The outcome of King/Drew is still uncertain.
There is clearly a lot of pressure on County officials to keep it open;
however, this pressure was unable to prevent closure of its trauma
center.
253 See, e.g., Randall, Racist Health Care, supra note 32, at 146-52.
254 See Steinbrook, supra note 235; Bloche, supra note 235. See also Randall, Racist

Health Care, supra note 32, at 170.
255 Rodde v. Bonta, 357 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2003) (issuing preliminary injunction to
prevent closure of the hospitals). See Western Law Center for Disability Rights
website for updates on litigation. As of October 2005, the County announced a
settlement to keep the hospital open. See Western Law Center for Disability Rights,
http://www.wlcdr.everybody.org (providing a copy of the settlement agreement).
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Legal advocates should also help communities use their power
proactively to demand more comprehensive reforms at the local and
federal levels that will help minimize existing pressures on hospitals in
urban settings. Rather than wait until a hospital closure decision has
been made to mobilize and fight, health care advocates and community
leaders should work closely to identify potential trouble spots and to
formulate plans for addressing the economic and quality of care
concerns that often drive hospital closures. 256 Such plans could then be
presented to local government officials as less discriminatory
alternatives that must be considered, rather than relying on the hospitals
or the local government body that would probably not have considered
or been required to look for less discriminatory options.25 7 Earlier
intervention by community advocates can influence the distribution of
public resources in ways that can relieve hospitals' financial stress
before it becomes too great.
Moreover, advocates should use other legal tools, such as
charitable trust, merger oversight, and state antidiscrimination laws to
influence the pattern of hospital restructuring in minority communities.
Successful models can be found in advocates' challenges to hospital
mergers that have threatened reproductive health care. For example, in
a few instances, community advocates, have used such laws to prevent
mergers that would have resulted in the elimination of certain
reproductive health services for women. 258 In some cases, advocates
used litigation, but in others, communities found that local public
officials were sympathetic to the community's concerns and willing to
use their discretion under the law to prevent disruption to health care
access. In some cases, community action has prevented the proposed
hospital closure or restructuring; in others, the community has been
able to use its political and legal leverage to ensure that at least a

256

See Sager, Testimony, supra note 15, at 403-09 (offering several alternatives to

closure that should be considered).
257 There is precedent for this. In New York, government officials initially refused to
allocate additional resources to a hospital because they were concerned that the
hospital would simply use the resources to expand and invest in greater technology in
ways that would drive up health care costs. It was also concerned that resources were
being diverted away from hospitals in communities with greater need. See
McLafferty, supra note 17, at 1085.
258 See, e.g., Brietta Clark, When Free Exercise Exemptions Undermine Religious
Liberty and the Liberty of Conscience: A Case Study of the Catholic Hospital
Conflict, 82 OREG. L. REV. 625, 646-48 (2003).
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portion of the resources would be redirected to259maintain access to
necessary health care for the affected community.
Finally, minority communities should use their power to insist
that any state or federal proposal for reform of the system includes a
race data collection system. Opportunities for demanding these tools
exist at every level. For example, as the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) continually enact changes to their fee for
service and managed care programs, race data collection should be
required. In California, the Department of Managed Health Care is
responsible for oversight of managed care plans, which have become
critical players in our health care delivery system. Health advocates
should empower communities to demand that any program for
monitoring health plan quality and compliance include a mechanism for
race data collection to help identify racial disparities. Although the
collection of this data may not be immediately valuable as a litigation
tool under our current civil rights enforcement structure, it can be very
valuable if there is an alternative structure, preferably a communitybased organization, that can gather, analyze, and use the data in
proactive ways to facilitate reforms and police providers at the
community level.
3. Community Education & Empowerment: Building Trust
Across Different Communities
Both the short and long term legal reforms identified above require
minority communities to become powerful politically and legally, and
to be able to use their leverage proactively. This may seem like an
unrealistic expectation for communities that are historically
economically underserved and politically vulnerable. It is possible,
however, and there are successful models for underserved communities
becoming more active and powerful in driving important reform. Legal
advocates are critical in this process and can facilitate community
empowerment in a number of ways.
In my opinion, the most critical ingredient for community
empowerment is trust - trust between the advocates and community,
between different groups within the community, and between the
community and the government officials responsible for protecting
their interests. Legal advocates have an important role to play in
restoring the trust that has been lost. In order to do this we must first
acknowledge the mistrust that has been created by the inherent flaws of
259

See Freeman, supra note 231, at 1051.
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our existing system. Communities need to be educated about why our
legal structure is flawed and what that means for the kind of advocacy
communities should use and the kind of reforms they should demand.
For example, many people attribute the hospital closure problem to a
conscious bias by the hospital or local decision maker, whether or not a
bias, in fact, exists. Thus, they continue to frame the problem in terms
of intentional discrimination, even though this obscures the bigger
problems that lead to hospital and physician flight. Advocates need to
educate underserved communities about the relationship between their
race, ethnic, or community specific concerns and the broader problems
of inadequate health care financing and facilities planning at the federal
and local levels. We need to demonstrate that the very structure of our
health care system is incompatible with racial equality and that an
overhaul of our system is necessary to any reform and meaningful
enforcement of civil rights protection.
Moreover, we have to help bridge different groups that have
common interests and complementary perspectives to build a broader
base and increase the political power and leverage of underserved
communities in fighting for health care reform. Indeed, experience
shows that plaintiffs have the greatest chance for success where such
coalitions are formed. For example, in Simkins, the lawsuit was
initiated by African-American physicians fighting on behalf of AfricanAmerican patients who were excluded from white facilities and forced
to incur dangerous delays at the few overburdened facilities willing to
accept blacks. In California, increasingly provider-patients coalitions
are being formed to assert their common interests in reforming the
health care financing system. One successful example mentioned
above was the fight to keep Rancho Los Amigos open. Another
successful example occurred in California a few years ago. There was
a ballot measure prohibiting the collection of race data that almost
everyone agreed would impede the ability of the government to identify
and remedy racial disparities in health care. A remarkably diverse
coalition of different racial and ethnic groups, women's organizations,
patients
GLBT 26 organizations, as well as health care providers and 261
advocates, all came together to successfully defeat the measure.
In a less successful example, provider and patients' advocates
came together to put an initiative on the ballot that would raise money
260 GLBT refers to Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgendered groups.
261 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Doctors, Educators, Civil Rights
Leaders Across CA Vow to Defeat Dangerous "Race Information Ban" (Apr. 23,
2002), availableat http//www.aclu.org/news/2002/n042302b.html.
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through a new tax, a significant portion of which would be directed to
hospitals and physicians who provide uncompensated emergency room
care. A key argument for the measure was the relationship between
physician and hospital flight and the uncompensated care
disproportionately provided by these providers. Unfortunately, it did
not succeed for a variety of reasons, including the failure to educate the
community about how this measure would help ensure continued
access.
Given the important link between universal care and fighting
racial disparities, minority communities must reach out to other groups
who would benefit from universal care as potential partners for reform.
In some cases, the partnerships are obvious, as for example where
closures will have a harsh impact on minorities and people with
262
disabilities, these groups have partnered to fight such closures.
Certain disease specific measures, such as public health measures to
fight HIV, also lead to atypical partnerships between the perceived
mainstream black organizations and GLBT groups. However, these
partnerships should not be atypical and should not only occur in
response to a discrete public health or community access issue. We
should build on the partnerships in broader and sustained ways to fight
inequality in health care generally.
Increasingly, there are reports about how the middle class is
also suffering the effects of our patchwork health care system, as
employers continually reduce, or eliminate altogether, affordable
employment based healthcare. 263 Moreover, seniors are increasingly
unsatisfied with the changes in Medicare and fear what further changes
to a managed care system will bring. Studies also show that even those
with insurance suffer because of limits on insurance and problems with
hospitals that pursue them into bankruptcy for extraordinary medical
bills that they couldn't cover. 264 The time is ripe for tapping into the
growing numbers of the middle class and seniors, minorities and nonminorities struggling through our health care maze as coalition partners
in the fight for health care reform. 265
262 See supra Part VI.2 (providing a discussion of Rodde v. Bonta).
263 See Ezekiel Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, Solved!, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, June

1, 2005, at 20 (arguing that the very soon government will not be able to ignore the
growing problem of gaps in the health care system and suggesting universal health
care vouchers as a possible solution); Jane Gross, The Middle Class Struggles in the
MedicaidMaze, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2005, at B 1.
264 Watson, Inequalities and Incentives, supra note 35, at 16.
265 Lee Walczak & Richard S. Dunham, Safety Net Nation: Why So Many Americans
Aren't Buying Into Bush's Ownership Society, Bus. WK., May 16, 2005, at 24-34.
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Finally, despite the history of mistrust generated by both the
federal and state government in minority communities, increasingly
local governments and officials are becoming more responsive to
communities' needs. They evidence a willingness to experiment or
partner with communities to prevent disruption in access to health care.
Oregon's experiment with universal healthcare on a local level is one
example. As already noted above, attorneys general in several states
have used their discretion and authority to prevent hospital mergers or
consolidations that would deprive communities of needed reproductive
health services. 266 Other states have considered atypical partnerships to
solve problems of health care shortages in the short term. For example,
in California initiatives have been considered to facilitate the
recruitment of physicians from other countries who are willing to work
in underserved areas. 267 Another recent example is the opportunity for
American medical students to be trained essentially for free in Cuba on
the condition that the physicians agree to work in underserved
communities in the U.S., an opportunity that met much resistance from
the Bush Administration. 268 These can clearly be seen as unpopular
partnerships for a variety of political reasons. While any proposals
must be made after critically considering the access and quality of care
implications, they should not simply be dismissed because of politics.
We should not be thwarted from our long term goals for universal
access with race-conscious tools for monitoring equality or our short
term goals of increasing the number of health care providers in
minority communities because of labeling or threats that such proposals
are anti-American by government actors unwilling to provide adequate
health care for all of its citizens.

266

See, e.g., Clark, supra note 258, at 646-48. Attorneys general, for example, have

used their powers to enforce charitable trust and antidiscrimination laws in ways that
ensured reproductive health services would not be terminated in hospital mergers.
267 See, e.g., Cal. A.B. 1045 (Mexico Physician Pilot Program designed to increase
health care access to California's Latino population). The program has been opposed
b the California Medical Association on quality of care grounds.
28

See Fitzhugh Mullan, Affirmative Action, Cuban Style, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED.

2680 (2004) (describing a program for U.S. citizens to study at the Latin American
School of Medicine (ELAM) in Havana, a school sponsored by the Cuban
government and dedicated to training doctors to treat the poor of the Western
hemisphere and African).
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4. Orient the Movement from Outside of the Current Political
System: Grass Roots Advocacy & Community Based
Organizations
examples
highlight
the importance of legal advocates
The above
working with health care advocates to design programs to minimize
disparities or increase access in the short and long term. However, it is
important that any meaningful proposal for change be initiated as a
grass roots, community-based movement. In order to fundamentally
restructure our existing system, change must come from people who
can think creatively and radically about the best ways to create a race
conscious, universal healthcare system, with meaningful legal
protection to force government accountability. Leaders vulnerable to
the kind of labeling and political pressures identified above are
constrained in their vision and ability to honestly critique the current
system. This results in the watering down of health care proposals for
fear of isolating powerful constituencies. 269 Moreover, a movement for
this kind of change should be institutionalized in order to decrease its
vulnerability to the localization, politics, or resources of any given
community. Finally, community based organizations should play a
prominent role in gathering and analyzing racial data about disparities
in access and quality of care. To the extent, such organizations can
proactively use this data to monitor health care providers, they can
become a critical resource for community policing of providers that are
performing poorly, at least until some public authority demonstrates the
willingness and ability to aggressively enforce antidiscrimination
mandates.
When I began this article I believed that I could find hope for a
meaningful change in our system. Within the last few days, however, a
hurricane devastated the Gulf Coast and left an indelible mark on the
nation. We have watched as the poorest people of New Orleans,
269 See,

e.g., ROBERT M. BALL, REFLECTIONS ON

MEDICARE:

How

MEDICARE CAME ABOUT,

PREPARING FOR THE CHALLENGES OF THE 2 1s

CENTURY

27-37, 29

(Resichauer, Butler & Lave eds., 1998) (stating that Medicare came about because the
advocates of universal health insurance coverage were discouraged); NORMAN
FROM THE AIDS EPIDEMIC TO NATIONAL
DANIELS, SEEKING FAIR TREATMENT:
HEALTH CARE REFORM

155-58 (1995) (describing Clinton's attempt "to seize a

political middle ground between a single-payer ('big government'), public insurance
scheme, on the one hand, and proposals that rely almost entirely on 'managed' market
forces (and weak of absent government mandates), on the other); Vernellia R.
Randall, Does Clinton's HealthcareReform ProposalEnsure Equality of Health Care

for Ethnic Americans and the Poor?, 60
the answer is no).

BROOK.

L. REv. 167 (1994) (explaining why
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predominantly black, were abandoned by our federal government for
days before finally sending help, and even then, not enough. We
learned that the federal government cut funding for repairs in the levees
that could have prevented some of the damage. We heard that this very
scenario had been predicted and that engineers knew and even called
attention to the fact that there would be no way to evacuate the poorest
people living in the most dangerous areas because they did not have
private transportation. Still, the government did not ensure that public
transportation would be available in case of evacuation. (The similarity
to the initial decisions in Wilmington to remove hospital services
without making any provision for people in the city to be able to get to
the new suburban location is telling). In other words, the government
abandoned these communities in important ways before the hurricane
hit. We have also seen the government try to divert our attention to the
"looting" of people desperately trying to survive, and away from the
obvious and ignoble government failures that have cost lives. It is hard
to be hopeful now.
Nonetheless, I am encouraged by the fact that for the first time
in a long time I hear uniform public outrage about these government
lapses - lapses which show an utter disregard for the welfare and safety
of the poorest and predominantly minority communities ravaged by this
Most importantly, people are talking about the racist
hurricane.
dimensions of this neglect in powerful ways. Our public discourse is
now completely overtaken by this intersection of race and class, in
ways that had been previously muted. The collective anger and
determination to hold the government accountable are precisely what
we need in order to create the chance for real change. This tragedy is a
surreal and unimaginable lens through which to truly understand the
insidiousness of our existing structure and the government's
responsibility in fostering the inequality, mistrust, and dehumanization
of our most vulnerable communities.
I want to be hopeful that despite the government's abdication of
its responsibility for Title VI enforcement, we will not accept the idea
that civil rights is indeed dead. Rather, we should harness our anger
and energy, and use them to prepare for a long and worthwhile fight to
redefine civil rights in an honest and meaningful way. 27 0 I am hopeful
that communities of color will see that the connection between racial
270

See, e.g., Charles Abernathy, When Civil Rights Go Wrong: Agenda and Process

in Civil Rights Reform, 2 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 177 (1993) (identifying the
over-reliance on the litigation and government-responsibility models as stymieing
civil rights progress and suggesting alternative models for change).
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inequality and economics can be used to give us power to reach out to,
and form coalitions with, other groups suffering under the collapse of
our patchwork delivery system. I am hopeful that the resurgence of
community action in response to hospital closures can be maintained
and strengthened in forward looking plans to radically restructure our
system. I am hopeful that providers and patients can be true partners in
this fight, as their mutual interests in adequate coverage and in the
importance of race data becomes clear. I am hopeful that as we
acknowledge the trust that has been undermined through the
government's and courts' decisions, we will regain the communities'
trust and empower them to effect real change. I am hopeful that change
will come with increased community education and power used to
forge creative public-private partnerships, where possible, or by
shaming and fighting to remove public officials who are not responsive
to demands for reform.
CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that Title VI helped reduce disparities created under a
system of de jure segregation and exclusion. Moreover, we have seen
that civil rights litigation has served as an important check at certain
levels. However, this progress has been sharply circumscribed as seen
through the problem of hospital flight from minority communities. The
problem is that Title VI promised more. It promised that the courts and
government agencies responsible for enforcing Title VI would ensure
an equal allocation of resources. Unfortunately, Title VI has been used
to create an artificial limit on our notions of what civil rights should
mean in health care in this country and to mute our criticism of the
government's responsibility for creating a health care system that is
fundamentally incompatible with racial equality.
Through this article, I was also forced to engage in serious selfreflection about my own role as a health law advocate in this struggle.
The opportunity I was given to present a preliminary version of this
paper at this symposium, hosted by the DePaul University College of
Law and Rainbow PUSH, only fanned the flames because the
conference brought together academics, health providers, legislators,
and most importantly, community members and activists. All came
with a desire to find a solution to racial disparities in health care. I am
mindful of Jesse Jackson's words at one point during the presentations
by academics - he admonished us not to use our intelligence, expertise,
and creativity merely to write law review articles that will serve as dust
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collectors. He implored us to be active, to do something to help craft a
real solution to this crisis. It is in the spirit of those words and the
energy of the conference that I write this piece - hopefully not to be
just another dust collector, but to encourage the use of our legal tools in
creative and powerful ways.

